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The brooding image of Shiite clerics glaring threateningly from under black 
turbans has become a symbol of radicalism in the West. From the seductive charisma of 
Ayatollah Khomeini to the fiery vitriol of Muqtada al-Sadr, or concern over the behind 
the scenes influence of Ayatollah Sistani, the role of the ulama1 in Shiite mass 
movements is often assumed but has not been thoroughly examined. Who are these 
scholars? What ideological and historical precedents empower their bid for political 
influence? Do they exert control over the movements or are they jumping on the 
bandwagon to avoid marginalization? This paper argues that a paradigm shift occurred in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s that reached its zenith with the Iranian revolution. This 
shift cast off centuries of tradition and legitimized Shiite political activism generally, and 
ulama involvement specifically. Shiite grievances emerged as a result of politically 
exclusive and indiscriminately repressive regimes. The Shiite hierarchy was uniquely 
situated to provide an in situ mobilization structure, charismatic and experienced leaders, 
and a vast wealth of symbols with which to frame an opposition movement. As an elite 
group, the Shiite ulama operated as movement entrepreneurs, recognizing (and in some 
cases provoking) structural and perceptual shifts in their respective political opportunity 
structures.2 Wielding their often significant resources and meaningful frames, the ulama 
seized what was perceived as favorable political opportunities in order to achieve their 
goals.  
In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom the sectarian balance of power, 
between Sunnis and Shiites, is a central factor for the propagation of Middle East peace. 
Current events in Iraq seem to emphasize the leadership  of mass movements by the Shiite 
ulama. Study of historical trends through the lens of social movement theory will analyze  
                                                 
1 The term ulama  (singular ‘alim) collectively refers to the members of the Islamic religious 
establishment including scholars, preachers, and teachers. Though the terms cleric and clergy are not 
completely analogous with ulama , they have been used extensively in western studies and I use them 
synonymously in this work. 
2 Charles Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: 
The Iranian revolution of 1979,” American Sociological Review 61, no. 1 (February 1996): 154.  
 
2 
the veracity of such conclusions and attempt to not only establish the degree of ulama 
control, but also the mechanisms by which such control is exercised. Understanding this 
relationship is critical to the formulation of accurate policy in countries with Shiite 
majorities, such as Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, as well as those with sizeable minorities such 
as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.  
The Shiite ulama have become more influential in mass movements since the 
Iranian Revolution. While influence has increased, this does not mean that the ulama 
have complete control. A wide array of secular organizations compete with religious 
activists to varying degrees of success. Nevertheless, political activism by religious 
scholars has certainly increased over the past three decades, largely enabled by 
authoritarian governments that exclude and repress opposition parties from meaningful 
participation in government. When opposition movements are prevented from joining the 
mainstream they tend to migrate to peripheral areas outside the state’s direct control. 
Religious and professional organizations often fit this bill. As the self-designated and 
traditional guardians of their communities vis-à-vis the state, the ulama have taken over 
the reigns of Shiite opposition. These activist ulama have responded to the demands of 
their followers to take action. This development advances the idea within social 
movement theory that movement entrepreneurs shape their platform in response to 
constituent input. However, there is a limit to these redefinitions. The more the actions 
deviate from their traditional base of authority, the more the ulama undermine their 
legitimacy in the community over the long-term. 
This introduction is divided into four parts. First, I examine the traditional and 
ideological role of the ulama and the institution of the marja’iya in order to establish a 
baseline for the comparison of later developments, survey the schools of thought in the 
Shiite community, and to contrast various ulama from their contemporaries. Second, the 
key influential role of the Iranian revolution is briefly discussed, concluding that its major 
contributions to the umma3 are in its demonstration effect and political and material 
support. Third is a literature review to survey the significant sources relied upon for this 
study. Lastly, I present an overview of the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
                                                 
3 The term umma  refers to the universal community of Muslims. 
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A. THE MARJA’IYA AND SHIITE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
1. The Marja’iya and taqlid 
The political environment of early Shiites had a profound effect on the formation 
and evolution of the ir ulama.4 The development of Sunni jurisprudence occurred in the 
context of a Sunni state. The Sunni ulama’s legal role was subsumed by the state and 
jurists became judges by political appointment. The Sunni jurist’s authority, therefore, 
was derived from the state and owed little to his actual credentials as a scholar. Religion 
and politics were integrated and the line separating them blurred. Conversely, the Shiite 
ulama formed in a Sunni-dominated state. As a persecuted minority, the Shiites had no 
involvement in official politics and their system of jurisprudence was founded outside the 
political sphere. The existence of the Shiite community became bifurcated, consisting of 
the spiritual realm of their religion and the profane external environment of their daily 
lives.5  
The Shiite Imamate doctrine is central to the distinction between the spiritual and 
profane realms. Shiites profess that sovereignty over mankind is exclusively the province 
of God. As God’s infallible representatives on earth, the Prophet and the Imams 
legitimately exercised authority on His behalf. All the governments which came after 
those of the Prophet and the Imams are therefore illegitimate.6  
After the Twelfth Imam went into occultation and his exertion of political 
authority effectively ended, the Shiite community was left without legitimate leadership. 
The Imam is expected to return at the end of days and restore justice to the world. As the 
messianic nature of the Hidden Imam became more developed, the nature of the Imamate 
transformed from a religio-political character to an almost exclusively religious one. 
Simultaneously, given that the Shiites did not exercise political power in any event, the 
ulama distanced themselves from politics as a realm beyond their mandate.7 
                                                 
4 Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi‘ism  (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 191-2. 
5 Ibid., 192.  
6 Joseph Eliash, “Misconceptions regarding the Juridical Status of the Iranian ‘Ulama,’” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 10, No. 1 (Feb., 1979): 21. 
7 Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 192. 
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A distinction arose concerning the legitimacy of government, creating in effect 
degrees of acceptability. In this light, a Shiite regime is not necessarily legitimate, since it 
is not governed by the Imam, but it is composed of believers who recognize that fact and 
attempt to adhere as closely as possible to the ideal state. On the other hand, a regime of 
non-believers, especially the Sunni, is by definition committed to “wrongdoing.” The 
regime’s actual behavior is irrelevant to their status as wrongdoers.8 From this logic came 
the ruling that Shiites seeking conflict resolution from a Sunni judge, as the legal arm of 
the state, were as guilty of wrongdoing as the Sunnis themselves. Thereafter, Shiites 
sought Shiite ulama to resolve disputes and accepted only their rulings. Two key factors 
emerged from this development. First, the Shiite’s relationship with an ‘alim was a 
voluntary one; he could choose the one he respected and whose rulings he would accept. 
Second and most importantly, the authority of the Shiite ulama was a function of their 
religio- legal learning and independent from state appointment.9  
Shiites remain firmly committed to the core Muslim belief that each individual is 
required to read and interpret the scripture for him/herself in order to accept and 
understand the faith’s fundamental principles. Blind imitation of others in the practice of 
religion is therefore prohibited. There was increasing recognition over time, however, 
especially as religious law became more complex, that the average person could not 
devote the time and effort necessary to fully comply with his religiously mandated 
obligations. Taqlid, or emulation, emerged as a solution to this dilemma.10 While all 
believers are expected to rely on themselves for understanding the fundamentals of the 
faith, it became permissible to consult with experts (the mujtahids) for specific legal or 
procedural guidance.11 Lay worshippers came to follow a specific scholar whose learning 
was sufficient to guide the emulator, the muqallid, along the righteous path. This 
interdependent relationship between marja’ and muqallid, formalized through the 
payment of alms, or the sahm al-imam, has become a central fixture of the Shiite 
                                                 
8 Eliash, “Misconceptions regarding the Juridical Status of the Iranian ‘Ulama,’” 21. 
9 Ibid., 13. 
10  Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 175-76. 
11 Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and 
Societal Change in Shi’ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
138-39. 
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religious hierarchy. The amount of alms an ‘alim receives is often, along with the 
acceptance of his peers, a key factor in determining his status as a marja’ and his relative 
position in the hierarchy. 12  
Choosing a marja’ to follow is an important obligation for Shiites. This is not a 
choice to be taken lightly. A potential muqallid must read the commentaries and other 
works of various marja’ and choose the one he feels most closely fits with his own 
interpretation of the faith. If in depth study is not practical, as is often the case, the 
muqallid is required to consult with knowledgeable people that s/he trusts who can help 
him come to an informed decision. 13 
The institution of the marja’iya, that being a single mujtahid whose religious  
authority exceeds all others and therefore is the recognized leader of the Shiite 
community, is a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging only in the mid 19th century. 
Even well into the 20th century the primary loyalty of most Shiites was to local sayyids or 
sheikhs rather than the more educated religious establishment of the shrine cities. This 
was particularly true of the Arab Shiites in more remote areas. Walbridge argues that 
even into the 1980s the concept of the marja’ was unfamiliar to many Lebanese Shiites, 
especially from the Bekaa.14 One probable cause for the basic inability of one marja’ to 
assert hegemonic influence over the international Shiite community seems to have been 
the difficulty of communication. Advancing technology has allowed the ulama to reach a 
much wider audience than they could with direct influence and word of mouth. Audio 
tapes of Khomeini’s sermons were widely disseminated and extremely popular prior to 
the Iranian revolution, greatly aiding his ascent to temporal power.15 The internet has 
made the Shiite leadership even more accessible, with notable marja’ maintaining 
websites that include not only their published works, but also a question and answer 
function that allows followers to solicit the marja’s opinion on unanswered or confusing 
                                                 
12 Linda S. Walbridge, “Introduction: Shi’ism and Authority” in The Most Learned of the Shi’a: The 
Institution of the Marja’ Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 5. 
13 Walbridge, “The Counterreformation,” 231-33. 
14 Walbridge, “Introduction,” 6. 
15 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 92-3. 
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subjects.16 The increasing ability to reach wider audiences is likely to continue the trend 
toward consolidation, strengthening the marja’iya as an institution and focusing 
emulation upon one, or possibly a handful, of well respected marja’.  
 
2. Traditional Thought 
Traditional Shiite thought asserts that only God can legitimately exercise 
sovereignty over man. The Imams, considered to be infallible, were God’s terrestrial 
representatives who led the community, politically and spiritually, in his name. When the 
Twelfth Imam went into occultation, this role eventually fell upon the ulama, religious 
scholars who, while as fallible as any other person, had attained a sufficient degree of 
religio- legal knowledge to guide the community until the day of his return. 17 
Shiite ulama had traditionally argued against attaining temporal power. Until the 
Safavid ascension in Iran in 1501, Shiites had constituted a minority operating within 
Sunni dominated states. Simply put, political power was not theirs to have and thus a 
moot question. As the Safavids converted Iran to Shi’ism, they exerted significant 
influence over the ulama. The Safavids gained control over and centralized the 
distribution of religious endowments and official appointments. Under Shiite rule the 
ulama were appointed to government offices, such as judgeships as well as religious 
posts such as each city’s Sheikh al-Islam: the city’s senior religious official. 18 When the 
Safavid gave way to the Qajar dynasty, the ulama began to assert more independence 
from the state.19 Whereas the Safavids could draw upon their own religious charisma to 
legitimize their rule, the Qajars relied upon the ulama to provide their support. The ulama 
initially did so, but as a result gained increasing autonomy over time. By the early 19th 
century, the ulama had separated to such a degree that Iran effectively operated under a 
dual system, the state and the religious hierarchy. 
                                                 
16 For example, Ayatollah Sistani’s website http://www.sistani.org (accessed March 10, 2005) and 
Ayatollah Fadlallah’s website http://www.bayynat.org (accessed March 10, 2005).  
17 Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 170-71, 192-95. 
18 Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 124-25. 
19 Said Amir Arjomand, “Millennial Beliefs, Hierocratic Authority, and Revolution in Shi’ite Iran,” in 
The Political Dimensions of Religion, ed. Said Amir Arjomand (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1993), 221. 
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Traditional ulama such as Ayatollahs Hakim, Kho’i, and Sistani have generally 
followed the quietist path, devoting themselves primarily to scholarship and charitable 
works. Operating within repressive Ba’athi Iraq is of course one possible explanation: to 
actively pursue a political agenda would have likely been suicidal. This factor does not 
explain their quietism completely. A key component in justifying the lack of political 
activism was the Shiite doctrine of entezar.20  
Entezar, the millenarian expectation of the Hidden Imam’s return, is commonly 
held to be the primary source of Shiite political quietism.21 As discussed previously, the 
Shiites hold that the only legitimate and just government is that of the Twelfth Imam, and 
that until his return any government is inherently illegitimate. Since just government is 
impossible so long as the occultation continues, it effectively passes from the political to 
religious sphere and out of the hands of mortals. In practice, this belief propagated 
passive acceptance of the status quo; since humanity is incapable of just government, the 
present is a trial to be endured until the Mahdi’s return. Popular understanding of entezar 
held that the attainment of justice, through the mechanism of the Mahdi’s return, could 
only happen when the world was filled with injustice. This logic suggests that striving to 
create a more just society actually delays the Mahdi’s return22 This ruled out political 
activism as a method of improving one’s life, a belief that clearly created friction within 
the increasingly politically aware Shiite community of the 20th century. Ayatollah 
Khomeini sought to undermine the pacifying effects of entezar in order to achieve his 
political goals.  
 
3. Khomeini  
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini transformed modern Shiite politics. The ulama, 
particularly in Iran, had become politically involved at various points in the past, but 
                                                 
20 Haggay Ram, "Exporting Iran's Islamic Revolution: Steering a Path between Pan-Islam and 
Nationalism," Terrorism and Political Violence 8, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 8. 
21 Hamid Enayat, “Iran: Khumayni’s concept of the ‘Guardianship of the Jurisconsult,” in Islam in the 
Political Process, ed. James P. Piscatori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 174.  
See also Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1982), 25. 
22 Ram, “Exporting Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” 8-9. 
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these periods of activism were usually tied to a specific issue with a particular short-term 
goal in mind. As discussed above, traditions of quietism, fueled by entezar, had 
established norms that discouraged direct involvement of the clerical class in governance. 
Khomeini built upon Shari’ati’s rejection of entezar, producing a political philosophy that 
he called the wilayet e-faqih: the rulership of the jurisprudent.  
A fundamental aspect of Shiite Islam is the doctrine of the Imamate. As discussed 
above, God designated an Imam to guide the umma, impart divine law, and ensure that 
the people remain on the virtuous path. Shiites assert that the Prophet Muhammad 
designated ‘Ali as the first Imam. Each Imam would then in turn designate his successor, 
who as God’s mortal representative would enjoy protection from error, attaining 
infallibility. 23 When the Twelfth Imam went into occultation, the ulama accumulated 
many of the Imam’s functions, including interpretation of the law and arbitration of 
disputes. They asserted a truncated form of the Imam’s authority in which they collected 
tithes and exercised trusteeship over those who were unable to care for themselves, such 
as orphans and the handicapped.24 They refused the complete authority of the Imam on 
grounds of incompetence since they did not possess one of the necessary prerequisites of 
the Imam, infallibility. Khomeini’s novel contribution, the wilayet e-faqih, expanded this 
limited role to equal that of the Imam for the duration of his absence.25 
The debate over the ulama’s proper role in society has been extensive. Khomeini 
did not originate the idea of an ulama-ruled state, but he resurrected and refined old 
arguments.26 Unlike previous incarnations, Khomeini’s conception of government placed 
its emphasis on the nature of the leader. The faqih, in this framework, was the supreme 
leader and guardian of the state rather than primus inter pares on a governing council or 
other committee- like body.  
                                                 
23  Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 155.  
24 This limited authority is called the al-wilaya al-khassa. For a detailed discussion see: Hamid 
Mavani, “Analysis of Khomeini’s Proofs for al-Wilaya al-Mutalqa (Comprehensive Authority) of the 
Jurist,” in The Most Learned of the Shi’a: The Institution of the Marja’ Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 183. 
25 Ibid., 183-4.  
26 Enayat, “Iran: Khumayni’s concept of the ‘Guardianship of the Jurisconsult,” 160-61.  
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Khomeini divided the guardianship functions of the Imams into two spheres, 
existential and relative.27 The existential sphere is the exclusive domain of the Prophet 
and the Imams; it is the spiritual realm whose understanding is reserved for these eminent 
and infallible leaders. The relative realm consists of the administration and guidance of 
the community, both political functions and steering the people toward the straight path 
morally. In this area even the fallible could excel, and the best suited to this task is the 
faqih. 
The jurisdiction of the ulama to exercise guardianship over several areas received 
almost universal acceptance in the Shiite community. These areas included the 
guardianship of those incapable of handling their own affairs such as orphans, widows, or 
the insane; guardianship over the resources of the religious community such as mosques, 
shrines, charity funds, and education; the ability to act as judges and rule on issues of 
religious law; and the guardianship of the community’s general welfare.28  Khomeini’s 
assertion that an additional area of competence was included in the ulama’s domain, that 
of direct political control, was controversial. Most Shiites accepted the limited role of the 
ulama in political activism. In many cases the ulama led protests and social movements 
in order to correct an unjust situation or otherwise petition the government on the behalf 
of the public welfare. Additionally, and often in conjunction with the above, the ulama 
led movements to protect religion and culture from internal or external threat.29 The 
actual exercise of political power lay beyond these widely accepted norms.  
Many of Khomeini’s critics based their arguments upon the works of the 
prominent 19th century ‘alim Sheikh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864). A mujtahid who is held 
in high esteem, Sheikh Ansari basically held to the aforementioned accepted areas of 
traditional guardianship.30 He based these arguments on the belief that the exertion of 
authority over others was the exclusive province of the Prophet and the Imams and that 
this mandate did not extend to the ulama. He considered such an extension to be absurd. 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 163.  
28 Gregory Rose, “Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah 
Khomeini,” in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki R. Keddie 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), 169.  
29 Ibid., 170. 
30 Enayat, “Iran: Khumayni’s concept of the ‘Guardianship of the Jurisconsult,” 161-62. 
10 
Sheikh Ansari’s position provides a foundation from which to elucidate Khomeini’s 
contribution.  
Deviating from the traditional norms guiding the ulama’s role in society, as 
discussed by Sheikh Ansari, Khomeini asserted that in the absence of the Hidden Imam, 
the ulama were the proper leaders of the state. Since the ulama were, by virtue of their 
deep knowledge of religion, morally superior to the general public, they must exert 
authority. Though Khomeini did not claim infallibility, his stance argues that the ulama 
and the supreme leader in particular are less fallible than everyone else.31 Contrary to 
their traditional role as advisor, the mujtahids should embrace their superior ability and 
command the faithful until the day of the Imam’s return.  
Besides arguing for the particular virtues of the wilayet e-faqih, Khomeini 
advocated activism to affect change. He framed his motivation in two major ways: the 
protection of Islam from the West, and the loss of religious values internal to the 
community. Khomeini viewed quietist ulama as complicit in these threats since they were 
not striving to stop them and achieve justice.32 The strength of his argument lay in this 
very threat, with which few would argue. The ulama had long had a critical role in 
defending the public interest from Western intrusion and exploitation, particularly in Iran 
but elsewhere as well. Further, the decline of religious values in the decades following 
the Second World War was a recognized problem in the Shiite communities. In large 
part, the Shiite movements of the Da’wah in Iraq and Musa al-Sadr in Lebanon were 
attempts to reverse the decline of religion in their communities. Unlike his ideological 
opponents within the ulama, Khomeini offered a plan to seize opportunities for change 
rather than continue to acquiesce to an undesirable status quo.  
 
4. Other Voices – al-Sadr and Fadlallah 
A younger generation of ulama diverged from the two aforementioned schools of 
thought, the traditional and the revolutionary. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Sayyid 
                                                 
31 Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: An Ideology of 
Revolutionary Violence,” in Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, ed. Martin Kramer (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1987), 58-9.  
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Fadlallah, while different with respect to each other, both advocated positions that 
blended or advanced traditional and revolutionary ideologies.  
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr remains one of the most respected Shiite scholars even 
almost twenty-five years after his death. A leading activist in Iraq’s Da’wah party, he 
sought to reform his religion through rigorous inward examination followed by an 
explicit and cogent philosophy. 33 Its purpose was to reconcile the apparent incongruity 
between religious belief and modern technology and science, while avoiding the pitfall of 
the West’s moral bankruptcy. His two most significant works, Our Philosophy and Our 
Economics, and presumably his unpublished but lost work Our Society, addressed this 
struggle and continue to be read and respected in the Muslim world. Our Economics is 
considered one of the seminal works on Islamic economics.  
Refuting socialism was a significant focus in Our Economics, reflecting the 
growing Shiite membership in leftist parties.34 Sadr demonstrated an in depth knowledge 
of western philosophy in his critique, an interesting intellectual divergence for a scholar 
steeped in Shiite religious law. The major contribution of Our Economics is a state-
centric system based on wealth redistribution (including land reforms) and Islamic law.  
Sadr became enamored with Khomeini and the concept of the wilayet e-faqih 
during the mid-1970s. His involvement with the Da’wah party and the uprisings  
precipitated by the Iranian revolution are discussed in Chapter II. On the surface his 
legacy is that of revolutionary leader and martyr, but his importance goes beyond these. 
He offered a philosophy distinct from his political or religious agenda that was unique 
and intellectually rigorous. Though the loss of Our Society makes it impossible to 
discover Sadr’s fully developed social system, he nevertheless achieved his objective – to 
formulate a universal Islamic philosophy to counter the competing scions of Western 
thought, capitalism and communism.  
Despite his opposition to socialism, Sadr recognized and was willing to use 
effective methods they pioneered. Sadr sought to cultivate a comprehensive Islamic                                                  
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ideology based on the Leninist model, comprised of a revolutionary vanguard, 
ideologically committed activists, and a cellular structure.35 From this intellectual point 
of departure, Sadr offered a four phase progression for the Da’wah’s development: party 
founding and recruitment; political opposition; ga ining control of the state and 
establishment of an Islamic political system; and protection of Islam and the umma.36 
The primary focus of effort, and presumably the longest temporally, was the political 
opposition phase. Sadr was content to advance the party to this phase, laying the 
groundwork for activism and opposing the regime as practicable. By patiently waiting 
until the proper opening appeared (i.e., sufficient political opportunities) the Da’wah 
would bide its time and strike when success was a realistic outcome.  
Sadr’s proposal of an operationalized version of the wilayet e-faqih was another 
significant contribution. 37 While Khomeini had outlined the parameters of the wilayet e-
faqih, he was not forthcoming with a plan for implementation. In response to a query by 
Lebanese ulama who requested his views on Khomeini’s teachings, Sadr wrote a short 
work that described the political system of an Islamic government.38 This document was 
revolutionary in that it proposed a popularly elected parliament and executive while the 
ulama was reserved a supervisory role to ensure compliance with Islamic law. Sadr’s 
plan pre-dated and foreshadowed many of the provisions of the Iranian Constitution.  
Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah is a complex and enigmatic  
figure even when considered in the context of the multifaceted and bewildering Lebanese 
political landscape. Though never officially associated with Hezbollah, Fadlallah’s 
religious interpretations and political acumen have played a central role in the Party of 
God’s emergence as a significant Shiite mass movement, as well as its evolution toward 
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participation in a secular government.39 He is best known for his willingness to accept a 
cross-communal secular Lebanese government and for his various charitable activities 
throughout Lebanon. He has shown a remarkable ability to retain his religious following 
while also attracting secular Muslim and even Christian supporters. His arguments are 
often framed in nationalist terms, focusing on the expulsion of the West from Arab lands. 
This has aided his emergence as a broad-based leader rather than as that of an isolated 
confessional group.   
Fadlallah is a vehement anti-colonialist, deriding the United States as the primary 
instigator of Muslim oppression. 40 Much of this sentiment stems from virtually 
unconditional American support for Israel, American presence in Beirut in the early 
1980s, the Gulf War, and the recent invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. He has been 
extremely vocal concerning the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, consistently 
questioning the ability of the United States to act as an arbitrator due to its partisan 
preferences and policies. Fadlallah has made clear his position on three important issues 
with broad implications: cross-communal dialogue and participation in a secular 
Lebanese state,41 anti-Westernism, particularly with respect to the United States, and 
intransigence toward recognition and peace with Israel. 42  
Fadlallah was a student of Ayatollahs Hakim and Kho’i, and inherited many of 
their views. The success of the Iranian revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini’s ascent to 
prominence created a conflict for Fadlallah. Ayatollah Kho’i, Fadlallah’s mentor whose 
charity organization he was responsible for in Lebanon, was outspoken in his criticism of 
the wilayet e-faqih arguing that the proper role of the ulama in observing and advising the 
government, not direct rule.43 However, Fadlallah saw in the Iranian Revolution a unique 
opportunity to forward his agenda. Iran supplied material resources, but also powerful 
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revolutionary symbolism. As Iran sought to expand its revolution internationally, it 
encountered difficulty in Lebanon overcoming language and cultural barriers. Fadlallah 
provided an indigenous spokesman there who could effectively convey the revolutionary 
message. In return Fadlallah was able to exploit the Iranian experience and funds to 
motivate his nascent movement.44  
Through the 1980s Fadlallah recognized that the disagreement between Khomeini 
and Kho’i concerning the wilayet e-faqih was well beyond his level; both marja’ were 
decades senior to him.45 He sought to walk a fine line between their opposing viewpoints 
while maintaining the goodwill of both. Only after they died, Khomeini in 1989 and 
Kho’i in 1992, did Fadlallah publicly articulate his opinion of the wilayet e-faqih. His key 
criticism of the wilayet e-faqih and Khomeini was what he viewed as an excessive 
reliance on charismatic leadership, creating a situation in “…which [the] messenger 
overshadows the message.”46 He viewed the creation of an Islamic state to be a rational, 
calculated act, not to be merely tied to support for a particular demagogue.  
Fadlallah has attempted to remain publicly aloof from politics, denying active 
involvement in Hezbollah despite his commonly accepted position as their “Spiritual 
Guide.” While he favored the institution of the wilayet e-faqih and its implementation in 
Lebanon during the 1980s, he has since retracted that view and publicly concluded that 
an Islamic government is not viable in Lebanon’s heterogeneous society. 47 The nature of 
this environment echoes in other rulings as well, singling Fadlallah out as one of the more 
liberal marja’ with respect to the role of women in society and other social issues.  
 
B. THE IMPACT OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran put other Muslim regimes on notice. Even a 
notionally strong regime with superpower support and a modern military could be 
overthrown. Two themes emerge as the animating force of the Islamic Republic’s early 
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foreign policy. 48 First, Muslims everywhere should be incited to rise up and install 
Islamic governments similar to Iran’s. Only through an Islamic government, it was 
thought, could pious Muslims live a virtuous life without the conflict resultant from 
secular state interference. Second, the umma should be reunited and restored to a position 
of dominance in world power. The artificial states, their boundaries, and the feelings of 
nationalism that followed were a legacy of imperialism, serving to divide and weaken the 
umma. By casting off such false loyalties and returning to their past organization 
Muslims could correct the vast disparity of relative power with the West.  
Ali Shari’ati was one of the first thinkers to discount quietism derived from 
entezar, arguing that not only was active resistance allowed, but it was necessary to 
create the proper conditions for the Mahdi’s return. 49 Following this line of reasoning, 
every act that reformed society brought the return closer. As Iran was the only place to 
have realized this ideal, it then became necessary to spread the good word throughout the 
world, freeing the oppressed, establishing justice, and accelerating the reappearance of 
the Hidden Imam.  
More pragmatically, universalizing and exporting the Iranian revolution helped to 
legitimize the newly ascendant and still fragile regime while distracting its opposition to 
problems beyond the frontiers.50 In either case, the Iranian leadership framed the 
revolution in universalist terms as a movement of true believers to free the oppressed and 
disadvantaged of the world from the yoke of imperialism and inequality. This resonated 
with Shiite audiences in two significant ways. First, the dichotomy of oppressed and 
oppressor is central to Shiite history and belief, centering on the imagery of Imam 
Hussein’s martyrdom at the Battle of Karbala in 680. Second, Shiite history has largely 
been one of repression and poverty. The imagery of religious oppression added to that of 
economic class oppression resonated widely, particularly as Shiites were the largest 
adherents of communist ideology in many states. By advancing an ideology that would 
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free the oppressed, one backed by a powerful Shiite state, poor Shiites saw a glimmer of 
hope that their lot in life would improve.  
Khomeini did not accept the framework of the international state system.51 He 
framed his movement as Islamic rather than Iranian with a universal appeal that 
transcended the artificial state borders separating the umma. Not only was spreading the 
revolution throughout the Muslim world desirable, it was a religious duty and obligation 
to cast down secular governments and restore the umma. He argued that,  
Both law and reason require that we not permit governments to retain this 
non-Islamic or anti-Islamic character…We have in reality, then, no choice 
but to destroy those systems of government that are corrupt in themselves 
and also entail the corruption of others, and to overthrow all treacherous, 
corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes…This is a duty that all Muslims 
must fulfill, in every one of the Muslim countries, in order to achieve the 
triumphant political revolution of Islam. 52 
Furthermore, the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Hashemi-Rafsanjani 
argued that,  
The Islamic revolution does not confine its true and noble nature to 
geographical borders and deems the conveying of the message of 
revolution, which is the selfsame message of Islam, as its own duty. 53 
In both statements the revolution is framed in universal, international terms as a 
movement to spread Islam and free the oppressed from various forms of “illegitimate” 
government.  
The reasons behind the failure of the Islamic revolution to spread throughout the 
Muslim world are complex and beyond the scope of this inquiry. However, several trends 
did emerge in Iranian actions that can briefly help explain the mediocre record.54 The 
primary example of this was the inability, in practice, to separate Iranian self- interest 
from the Islamic Revolution’s international incarnation. As the Iran-Iraq War was joined 
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and expanded in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Iranian rhetoric often took a 
nationalist rather than Islamic tone to rally the troops and general public. When it did take 
a religious tone, it tended to use Shiite symbology. The Iranian nationalist and Shiite 
contexts failed to resonate, and indeed understandably repelled, those who did not 
identify as one or both of these groups. Additionally, as the progenitors of the revolution, 
Iranians expected themselves to lead movements abroad. While Shiite movements were 
eager to receive aid and support, they were not interested in relinquishing their power to 
foreigners. After the first few years, the Islamic Republic was largely confined to aiding 
dissident groups without the realistic expectation of fostering populist revolution on the 
scale of 1979.  
The Islamic Revolution successfully exported itself in two ways: demonstration 
effect and political and material support. Demonstration effect refers to a successful 
example, in this case Iran, which proved the feasibility of collective action. Other groups, 
even if widely divergent in ideology or goals, learn from the example of successful 
movements and tend to adopt similar tactics. I define political and material support as 
state sponsored training, funding, and diplomatic aid to social movement organizations. 
The Iraqi case study aptly illustrates the demonstration effect. The Shiite opposition was 
primarily motivated by the success of an Islamic populist uprising and sought to recreate 
it in Iraq. Little more than the Iranian example was needed to convince the Da’wah 
leadership that revolution was a possibility achievable through mass protest.  
The Hezbollah case reinforces the importance of political and material support to 
the Lebanese movement. Hezbollah was able to expand rapidly and become a significant 
player in the Lebanese conflict through the recruitment of salaried militiamen. This was 
only made possible through Iranian patronage and made more effective with training by 
the Revolutionary Guard. Without this external infusion of resources, it is likely the 
Lebanese Shiites would have remained a disparate community working at cross purposes.  
The Bahrain case also relies on the use of Iranian political and material support. 
The various opposition movements that emerged in the 1980s were never able to claim 
populist support, forcing activists to rely upon Iranian funding, training, and safe-havens. 
The Shiite movement in Bahrain during the 1990s was not significantly affected by the 
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Iranian Revolution, other than a possible nod to its demonstration effect. That movement 
however, remained committed to explicitly secular political goals even after it became 
dominated by religious frames and mobilization structures.  
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Social movement theory is a fairly new discipline that is constantly evolving, 
especially when applied to the Middle East. A common approach in the past has been 
“relative deprivation” which asserts that collective action is born from poverty, lack of 
education, and haplessness. Another common bias of literature on the Middle East is that 
Arabs or Muslims are in some way unique. Thus theory drawn from experiences external 
to the region is inapplicable. This study rejects the two preceding approaches, instead 
arguing that social movements in the Middle East derive from stimuli explicable with a 
broader cross-cultural theory, namely political disenfranchisement and indiscriminate 
repression. Social movement theory is a compelling and parsimonious approach that 
explains the shift from acquiescence to collective action. 55  
I based my treatment of social movement theory upon several foundational works 
in the field. Sidney Tarrow’s Power in Movement56 was instrumental to my 
understanding of political opportunities and framing. Also fundamental to this thesis were 
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald’s work Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements57 
and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s effort Dynamics of Contention.58 These studies 
provide an effective social movement framework that illuminates the qualities of 
contentious politics. The collective works of these scholars provide the foundation upon 
which later studies, including those that apply social movement theory to Muslim 
experiences, are built. I rely on their generally accepted variables (political opportunities; 
mobilization structures; and framing) to organize this thesis and focus my inquiry. 
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Charles Kurzman significantly contributed to my understanding of political opportunities 
and mobilization structures. In “Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement 
Mobilization,”59 Kurzman demonstrated how existing organizations, in this case religious 
institutions, can be co-opted by fringe membership to carry out the agenda of a social 
movement. Included is an analysis of factors that make an organization more or less 
susceptible to cooptation. In “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in 
Social-Movement Theory,”60 Kurzman made the useful distinction between actual 
structural opportunities and their perception among opposition activists. He concluded 
that in some cases structural opportunities can actually be created through the 
manipulation of perceived opportunities by movement entrepreneurs. 
I also utilize several treatments of Islamic social movements, primarily those of 
Mohammad Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz.61 Wiktorowicz’s compilation forwards the 
difficult but necessary task of bringing Middle East studies and social movement theory 
together. Particularly useful were the chapters by Wiktorowicz, Lawson, and Smith. The 
introduction by Wiktorowicz provides an excellent primer on social movement theory 
and its application to Islamic activism. Fred H. Lawson’s “Repertoires of Contention in 
Contemporary Bahrain” offered invaluable insights into the Shiite movement in Bahrain 
by explaining it through the lens of social movement theory.  
To establish the traditional role of the ulama as a baseline to track evolving roles, 
I used Linda S. Walbridge’s compilation The Most Learned of the Shi’a.62 This work is 
unique in its extensive and penetrating examination of the Shiite ulama, their history, 
intellectual and religious foundations, and elucidation of prominent schools of thought 
within the institution. These basic sources were complimented by data on Iran, Bahrain, 
and Lebanon, and assessments of the ulama historically and currently. 
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D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II focuses on political opportunity. Social movements are shaped by the 
environment in which they develop. Political opportunity is a term often overused and ill 
defined. I argue that the decisive factors for inciting contentious collective action are 
exclusion from meaningful political participation and indiscriminate repression by the 
state. Once defined, political opportunity will be examined with respect to the three case 
studies; Bahrain, Lebanon, and Iraq. The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that 
the two factors discussed above are present in each case.  
The ability to efficiently mobilize resources is what separates successful 
movements from failures. Effective resource mobilization refers to interpersonal 
networks and money as well as other tangible resources. In Chapter III, I assert that the 
ulama were particularly well suited for the task of mobilization due to their existing 
organizational structure and command of resources independent of the state. In particular 
their loose organization ensured against efforts by the state to destroy the organization’s 
leadership.  
Attracting public support is a critical activity for a movement. The strategic use of 
symbols in the three cases is the focus of Chapter IV. The most difficult aspect of 
framing is to operationalize symbols that are traditional enough to resonate with their 
target audience, but at the same time radical enough to motivate action. 63 As masters of 
the vast corpus of Shiite history and law the ulama were uniquely suited to lead 
revolutionary movements.  
In Chapter V, I conclude that Islamic Republics following the Iranian model are 
unlikely to occur in the future. The wilayet e-faqih was effective only when led by 
Khomeini’s charismatic authority. By deviating from tradition, Khomeini undermined the 
traditional authority of the Shiite hierarchy, a limitation he overcame, but one that his 
successors were unable to accomplish. The Islamic Republic’s twenty-five years of 
mediocrity has demonstrated the negative aspects of direct political rule by the ulama. 
Leading ulama outside of Iran, particularly Ayatollahs Sistani and Fadlallah, have 
effectively rejected Khomeini’s doctrine and returned the ulama to their traditional role - 
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that of influential and highly respected members of their community who advise lay 
politicians in the exercise of temporal authority.  
This thesis has been able only to examine the historical role of the ulama in Shiite 
social movements, not to scrutinize the dynamics of necessary and sufficient conditions  
for their involvement. Through an analysis of three divergent Shiite movements, I have 
attempted to generalize trends in the ulama’s activist role since their emergence from 
quietism in the 1970s. Building on these trends I posit that proliferation of direct political 
rule by the ulama, according to the model of Khomeini’s wilayet e-faqih, is an unlikely 
development in the near future.  
When exercising their traditional role as quietist guardians of the status quo, the 
Shiite ulama derive their legitimacy from Weber’s concept of traditional authority. 64 The 
voluntary relationship between marja’ and muqallid resembles an informal democratic 
institution. 65 A marja’ must address the concerns and requirements of his muqallid or the 
emulator will find one who will. Conversely, the muqallid needs the guidance of the 
marja’ to properly fulfill his religious obligations and to understand how religious law is 
applicable to the constantly changing world. As a result of this mutually supportive 
relationship, the marja’ and other ulama may seek to interpret and change tradition in 
order to respond to constituent demands. Given sufficient popular support for these 
demands, elements of the ulama become movement entrepreneurs to carry out the 
requested changes. In these cases, the critical variable is not the leader himself, but rather 
the ability of his position to resonate with the public. When this position creates enough 
popularity for the leader, he is then able to affect change on the actual practice of Shiite 
doctrine. 
The Shiite hierarchy possesses ample “organizational opportunity” for movement 
entrepreneurs to capitalize on. As an institution the Shiite ulama have difficulty policing 
their own membership for compliance with the leadership’s position, since an ‘alim’s 
reputation is as much a function of popularity and size of following as it is acceptance by 
the hierarchy. The marja’ must convince his followers that his actions are correct rather 
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than force them. Kurzman asserts that organizations incapable of strictly policing their 
membership are open to cooptation by internal movement entrepreneurs.66 This 
“organizational opportunity” gives ulama who seek to respond to popular requests the 
latitude to do so.  
I argue that when the ulama deviate too radically from the traditional jurisdiction 
of religious law, they undermine their own legitimacy and harm the institution in the 
long-term. The exercise of charismatic authority by an exceptional leader, Khomeini for 
instance, can mitigate the harmful effect during his reign, but faces difficulty in its 
institutionalization following the leader’s death.  
While the ramifications of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 for Shiite movements 
are still unclear, my study offers an answer to those who fearfully predict the rise of a 
Shiite dominated Islamic state in post-Ba’ath Iraq. I base these conclusions not on recent 
and unexamined events, for which we still have little data, but on historical analogies of 
similar Shiite social movements.  
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II. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY  
Political opportunity is a nebulous term that often accumulates tangential factors. 
Multiple factors fit somehow under this heading. While students of social movements 
generally agree on the importance of political opportunity to the evolution of a 
movement, defining and constraining the bounds of this variable is a source of endless 
contention. At the most basic, it is agreed that the political environment and institutions 
in which a social movement develops shapes that movement in specific ways related to 
its political context.67 By its nature as an oppositional force, its interaction with the state 
creates an iterative process of change within both the opposition and the state. This 
dynamic relationship, combined with external factors, creates openings in which political 
action is possible. This holds true for both the opposition and the establishment. Various 
emergent opportunities either favor opposition-led reform or regime-led repression. 
These political opportunities are fickle and can pass quickly. Only when a movement is 
properly motivated, able to mobilize sufficient resources, and able to frame their 
movement in ways that resonate with their base of support can it take advantage of the 
fleeting moments of opportunity.  
Charles Kurzman usefully distinguishes between structural and perceived 
opportunities.68 As a point of departure, he uses Alexis de Tocqueville’s assertion that 
when an oppressed people recognize the state weakening its repressive measures, they 
will rebel. Kurzman agrees with this assertion, but refines it by arguing that structural 
change (e.g. a significant incapacity in the state’s coercive apparatus) is separate from the 
perception of that change. That is, the structural change is only significant if it is 
recognized and acted upon. When the structural and perceived opportunities correlate, the 
potential for a successful movement increases. Two mismatches are possible: failing to 
perceive existing structural opportunities, and perceiving structural opportunity where 
none exists. When mismatches occur, movement failure, at least tactically, usually 
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results. The notable anomaly to this assertion is the Iranian Revolution, a case in which 
Kurzman argues the opposition effectively created perceived opportunity without 
preexisting structural opportunity. Movement entrepreneurs, in this study the ulama, are 
critical to recognizing and shaping potential opportunities.  
Disagreement exists over the extent to which different influences are included in 
the political opportunity variable. Two major foci emerge from the debate: the degree of 
meaningful access to the political process and the state’s capacity and proclivity to 
repress opposition or dissent. Mohammad Hafez uses these two metrics to evalua te the 
political opportunity in his study of contentious social movements in Algeria and 
Egypt.69 He argues that the political environment places constraints upon and 
opportunities for an emergent movement. The degree to which opposition movements are 
allowed access to political decision-making is isolated as a key factor affecting whether a 
movement resorts to violence and revolution or peaceful activism and reform. 
Exacerbating this effect is state repression. When used discriminately it tends to have 
little effect. Indiscriminate repression not only radicalizes the movement, but also 
increases sympathy for it among the public and mobilizes new members that might have 
otherwise remained docile. These two factors create conditions that empower a 
movement to act decisively when a favorable opportunity emerges. Furthermore, the 
iterative nature of contention with the state actually creates political opportunities that 
can be taken advantage of by either participant.70 
The three case studies examined in this paper fit well within this framework for 
political opportunity. Political opportunity in Bahrain, Lebanon, and Iraq differ in 
specificity, but share a common lack of opposition influence in the established political 
system as well as a large degree of state repression. Bahrain and Iraq are both autocratic 
states governed by a religious minority in which the majority is politically 
disenfranchised and brutally repressed when collectively expressing dissent. In Bahrain 
the impetus of the reform movement followed from the efforts of disenfranchised elites to 
restore the 1973 constitution. They broadened a petition campaign that started with elites 
to include the dissatisfied Shiite majority. The resulting repression by the state led to a 
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spiraling escalation of hostilities, a political opportunity that was exploited by the Shiite 
ulama. The situation in Iraq was similar. The Da’wah party initially formed to foster a 
resurgence of Shiite piety, but quickly evolved into a force that organized public religious 
observances and worked to protect followers from government repression. The two major 
uprisings, in 1979-80 and 1991, were both attempts to take advantage of an apparent 
political opening, in the former case the success of the Iranian revolution and in the latter 
the perceived weakness of the Iraqi regime following its military defeat in Kuwait by the 
United States.  
Lebanon is a different case. Hezbollah emerged within the context of a civil war 
and occupation during which the state did not possess an effective political framework or 
capacity to use force. The Lebanese Shiite movement, and its spawn the Lebanese 
Resistance Detachments, or Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah (AMAL), emerged in 
the run-up to the civil war in order to address many of the issues the state was unable to: 
specifically, the disproportionately weak representation of Muslims in the Lebanese 
government and Israeli collective punishment against Shiite villages in response to 
Palestinian activities. Already splintered off of AMAL following Musa al-Sadr’s 
disappearance, the Hezbollah precursors arose to contest the Israeli invasion in 1982, 
coalescing in large part from local militias devoted to village defense. In this case, the 
lack of formal institutions to participate in and the repression of the IDF precipitated a 
self-help strategy of militant opposition.  
 
A. BAHRAIN: POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND REPRESSION 
The call for political participation has been the raison d’être of the Bahraini 
opposition for decades. Following the al-Khalifah conquest of Bahrain in the eighteenth 
century, and the monarchy’s alliance with Great Britain in the nineteenth century, the 
original Shiite inhabitants have been disenfranchised politically. Hopes soared with the 
establishment of the constitution in 1973, but were soon shattered. Reestablishment of the 
constitution was the primary goal of the opposition movement, though Shiite ideology 
became an important motivator after the Iranian revolution. 71   
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Since independence from Great Britain in 1971, the al-Khalifah family has 
maintained a nearly complete monopoly of power in Bahrain. The first emir, Isa bin 
Salman al-Khalifah, initially favored a constitutional arraignment consisting of a partially 
elected parliament, similar to the successful Kuwaiti model.72 The constitution was 
enacted in 1973, with thirty elected and fourteen appointed members of the national 
assembly. The emir’s flirtation with limited democracy proved to be short- lived. Upset 
over the national assembly’s refusal to ratify a security bill that severely restricted civil 
liberties, in August 1975 the emir suspended the constitution and dissolved the 
parliament.73 This act would become the central rally point for future opposition.  
Political power in Bahrain is divided along sectarian lines. The Khalifah and their 
minority Sunni allies hold all significant ministries. Where Shiites are allowed 
participation, six of eighteen cabinet ministers are Shiite; it is in lesser ministries not 
related to security or foreign affairs.74 During the mid 1970s for example, Shiites led five 
ministries: health; legal affairs; commerce and agriculture; public works, power, and 
water; and transportation and communications.75 Thus, the regime pays lip service by 
allowing very limited Shiite participation while insuring against their accumulation of 
coercive force. This attempt is of course transparent to most Shiites and has little effect in 
placating their desire for a meaningful voice.  
The establishment of the Consultative Council (majlis al-shura) in 1992 was 
another attempt by the emir to curry favor with proponents of democratic reform, Sunni 
and Shiite alike.76 This body of forty notables, many of whom were previously members 
of the National Assembly, serves as advisors to the emir but have no legislative powers. 
Additionally the ir deliberations are not open to public scrutiny. Although Shiites hold 
twenty-one of the forty seats, representation is still disproportional since they comprise 
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approximately 70 percent of the population. 77 Unsurprisingly, the Consultative Council 
has not satisfied opposition demands for representative government. The council did 
create political opportunity, however. In his examination of reform in the late Soviet 
Union, Tarrow recognized that attempts at reform that increase access to the political 
system tend to create space that can be exploited by opposition entrepreneurs.78 The 
emir’s establishment of the Consultative Council was an attempt to co-opt his opposition, 
but instead legitimized their place in government, further demonstrating his denial of 
meaningful Shiite participation, and created a new injustice for the opposition to focus 
upon.  
By the outbreak of hostilities in 1994, the Khalifah regime had proven itself 
unwilling to share political power if it threatened or eroded their overall control. The 
executive, in the form of the emir, completely dominated government. He enjoyed the 
ability to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers at will; members owed their political 
livelihood and future to the emir. The Consultative Council, the only nod toward 
establishing a legislative body since 1975, was endowed only with advisory powers and 
had no ability to legislate. Shiites were either excluded from government or relegated to 
positions of peripheral importance and any democratic concessions were only cosmetic. 
Mohammad Hafez identifies exclusion from the political process as one of two causal 
factors for violent rebellion against the government.79 Lack of institutionalized political 
influence forces the opposition to work outside the established framework of government 
to affect policy. It is not, however, enough to incite violence on its own. Armed dissent 
also requires another factor, which the al-Khalifa regime has provided in abundance, the 
indiscriminate repression of its opposition.  
The outbreak of violence in Bahrain was primarily a series of mass protests, 
bombings, and arson. Without significant exceptions, the government response was 
indiscriminate arrests and the exile of purported leadership figures. Executions were more 
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discriminate, but still common. Arrests in the wake of a protest event, violent or not, 
often numbered in the hundreds or thousands, many times including women and children.  
The outbreak of violence in 1994 is generally considered to have been 
precipitated by the circulation of an open letter to the emir that requested restoration of 
the National Assembly. Supporters contend that a petition containing over 22,000 
signatures was included as evidence of popular support.80 The Bahraini regime harassed 
and threatened those leading the petition effort, primarily Shiite ulama. This response 
increased the tension between the government and the protest movement, fanning an 
already flammable situation.  
Tension erupted into chaos on November 25, 1994 during a charity relay 
marathon. The race course meandered through several Shiite villages, prompting ulama 
led protest against the immodestly dressed athletes. Shouting, pushing, and stone 
throwing ensued, the protest escalating in size and violence in the face of resistance.81 
Twenty men were arrested in connection to this event, including Sheikh Ali Salman al-
Buladi, a young, popular, Shiite ‘alim, on December 5, 1994.82 Ali Salman’s arrest 
caused riots that lasted for two months. Authorities used riot control agents and rubber 
bullets liberally to disperse protesters. Two men were killed in Sanabis when police used 
live ammunition on the crowd.83 Hundreds were arrested on the street, hundreds more as 
a result of police raids on houses. Many were held without being charged for months, 
even years. Ali Salman and a handful of other ulama were exiled in early 1995.  
The protest spawned in response to the marathon incident and Ali Salman’s arrest 
only hardened the regime’s commitment to repressing dissent. During the early 1990s, 
the opposition was generally unified across sectarian lines, Sunni and Shiite alike 
advocating for the reinstatement of the constitution. By late 1994 however, the leadership 
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had largely been taken over by Shiites, especially the ulama. They were the impetus 
behind the campaign for petition signatures and freely used their sermons to advocate 
political change.84 Recognizing this shift and eager for someone to blame, the 
government began arresting respected ulama and disrupting their services. Most 
prominent of these was Sheikh Abd al-Amir al-Jamri, the leader of the Bahrain Islamic 
Freedom Movement and a former member of the National Assembly.85  
The Bahraini regime seemingly softened its position in the summer of 1995 when 
it began secret negotiations with Sheikh al-Jamri and other detained ulama, including 
Abd al-Wahab Hussain, Sheikh Khalil Sultan, and Hasan Mushaima. These discussions, 
often personally conducted by the head of Bahrain’s Intelligence Service, Ian Henderson, 
offered release from jail in return for quieting the protest movement.86 Upon reaching an 
agreement, al-Jamri and the others were set free in September 1995. Their attempts to 
discourage violence were successful in the following months with the overall number of 
incidents sharply declining.87 The government failed to abide by its commitments though, 
and the recently released clerics soon resumed anti-government sermons. Police began 
arresting parishioners as they left Friday services, arresting ulama, and resorted to heavy-
handed tactics to break up crowds. Recognizing that relatively moderate activities were 
not effective in changing government policy, mass protest and stone-throwing were 
joined by a spate of bombings and arson that lasted for a year and a half.88  
The combination of an exclusionary political process and indiscriminate state 
repression created a political opportunity structure in Bahrain that was favorable for 
violent protest. The other critical factors, mobilization structures and framing, will be 
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B. LEBANON: WEAK STATE, EXCLUSION, AND INVASION 
The Shiites of Lebanon have been politically impotent for much of their history. It 
was only in the 1950s and 1960s that a political consciousness began to emerge.89 
Though Shiites lagged behind other confessional groups in economic and political terms, 
they nevertheless were increasingly exposed to and affected by modernity and basic 
education. Many sought to escape from the control of the local political elites, the 
zu’ama’. These elites ran a rigid patron-client framework that dominated Shiite politics. 
As a result, many young Shiites were drawn to parties that advocated equality and 
improved social services. The communist party and sundry left-wing movements were 
the main benefactors of this trend.90  
The post-colonial Lebanese state was based upon proportional representation of 
confessional groups in the parliament and other government offices. Based on the 1932 
census, these accommodations were delineated in the National Pact of 1943. Over the 
ensuing decades Lebanon experienced a dramatic demographic shift in which the Shiite 
community grew from the third most populous to the first.91 No corresponding shift in 
the political representation followed, creating a significant factor leading up to the 1975 
Civil War.  
Despite the increasing political consciousness and dissatisfaction, the Lebanese 
Shiites remained fractious. They tended to join multi-confessional parties, of which none 
gained hegemonic control of Shiite loyalty. A large percentage joined parties in search of 
a salary rather than out of civic-mindedness. Into this political maelstrom arrived a 
charismatic Najaf-trained ‘alim named Musa al-Sadr. He gained a following quickly and 
emerged as a leading voice in the Shiite community. One of his initial efforts and most 
important contributions was to overcome many of the cleavages that divided Lebanese 
Shiites, forging the geographically and even culturally diverse coreligionists into a proper 
nation. Sadr’s importance was highlighted when he was made Chairman of the newly 
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established Supreme Shi’i Council in 1969.92 Though it rapidly lost influence due to the 
ascendance of the militias, this institution reflected the increasingly prominent role of 
Shiites in Lebanese national politics.  
Musa al-Sadr purposefully launched a mass movement in 1974 which he called 
Harakat al-Muhrumin (the Movement of the Deprived). Its stated purpose was to strive 
against the grievances and oppression of the Shiites in order to affect social justice.  The 
movement became marginalized with the outbreak of Civil War in 1975, but launched a 
militant wing, AMAL, that would become the most prominent Shiite organization in 
Lebanon. 93  
Perhaps Sadr’s greatest contribution came following his disappearance, and 
probable death, in August 1978 while on a trip to Libya. Already popular, his esteem and 
reputation grew exponentially. Sadr’s followers even framed his disappearance as 
“occultation, ” creating parallels to the vanished Shiite Twelfth Imam: symbolism that 
greatly resonated with their Shiite constituency. AMAL was subsequently led by Nabih 
Berri, a lawyer who successfully worked to secularize the organization. 94 This change in 
course led religiously minded activists to leave AMAL, forming the initial core in 
Southern Lebanon that would later become Hezbollah.   
The chaos of the Lebanese Civil War, which lasted from 1975-90, created unique 
conditions for nascent social movements. Most obvious was the lack of a political system 
to participate in. Though the government officially never dissolved, it was at varied times 
either completely ineffectual or a tool of the Christian militias; in either case no 
opportunity existed for Shiites to participate in the decisions of state. The other major 
contribution of Lebanon’s political environment was the requirement to be armed. An 
organization’s primary role became protection of its constituents, especially by the early-
1980s when the various groups coalesced inward forming a de facto canton system.  The 
prevalence of violence shaped an emergent group’s possib le course, the classic security 
dilemma prevailed.  
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The Shiite community of Southern Lebanon was not repressed by their domestic 
state, but were instead the recipients of collective reprisals by the Israeli Defense Force 
(IDF) and their proxy, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Palestinian refugees lay at the 
core of the issue. Southern Lebanon had longstanding economic and cultural ties with 
Palestine and felt their plight in the aftermath of the 1948 Israeli War of Independence. 
The IDF severed traditional trade routes, but for the most part the shared border was quiet 
until the late-1960s. The Cairo agreements of 1969 asserted the right of Palestinians to 
launch guerilla attacks against Israel from Lebanon. 95 Additionally, the ouster of the PLO 
from Jordan in “Black September” of 1970 led to an influx of Palestinian insurgents in 
Southern Lebanon.  
These immigrants to the South had the sympathy of their hosts, but most thought 
that the armed groups would become dangerous. They were right. The Palestinians 
rapidly became the most significant armed group in the South. The Lebanese Army, 
unpopular and viewed to be dominated by Christians, was unwilling or unable to keep the 
Palestinians under control. Besides preparing raids against Israel, the Palestinians also 
became involved in local politics.96 A variety of Lebanese leftist groups were struggling 
to counter the zu’ama stranglehold on political power. Both sides sought to co-opt the 
Palestinians and gain influence from their preponderance of arms. The leftist groups were 
generally more successful at achieving this alliance, but in any case the domestic political 
struggle aided by foreign fighters reduced support for the Palestinians in the Lebanese 
populace and reinforced their image as troublemakers.  
The increase of Palestinian militants in Southern Lebanon prompted Israeli raids. 
Before 1970 these attacks were primarily artillery barrage and air attacks, but after May 
1970 ground attacks occurred as well. The targets were usually Palestinian camps and 
military bases, but Lebanese villages were often damaged. A conscious strategy emerged 
in the IDF to terrorize the civilian population in order to create and widen cleavages 
between the Lebanese and Palestinians.97 The thought was that if association with 
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Palestinians were made to be sufficiently painful, the Lebanese would cease their support. 
To an extent this worked. In response to the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich 
Olympic Games, Israel launched an incursion in September 1972 that left over 80 
Lebanese civilians dead.98 Artillery and air strikes continued to pound Lebanese villages. 
Combined with the destabilizing effect of Palestinian involvement in local politics, 
Lebanese civilians in the South withdrew their support from the Palestinian insurgents.  
Operation Litani in March 1978 was an extreme example of the Israeli strategy. 
The nominal objective was the establishment of a 10-km wide security zone that was 
intended to prevent incursions of Palestinian guerillas. Instead the IDF invaded all the 
way to the Litani River, occupying more than 10 percent of Lebanon’s territory. 
Estimates assert that about 1,000 Shiite civilians were killed, many more were 
wounded.99 Additionally, vast numbers of houses were destroyed, leaving thousands 
homeless. Israel withdrew in June, but left the 10-km “security belt” in the hands of their 
proxy, the SLA, under the command of Major Saad Haddad.  
The insecurity of the late-1970s had a profound effect on the formation of the 
Shiite movement. Villages in the South began forming their own security forces, often 
with the purpose of keeping Palestinians out in an effort to avoid Israeli collective 
punishment. These village militias came to recognize the value of associating themselves 
with a larger organization to better assure their security. AMAL, and later Hezbollah, 
would benefit from this trend.100   
The indiscriminate repression of civilians by Israel in Southern Lebanon, most of 
whom were Shiite, did accomplish the task of reducing popular support for the 
Palestinians. However, the unintended consequence was the formation of self-help 
militias devoted at first to expulsion of Palestinians from local villages, but then 
expanded their mandate to resist the Israeli occupation. These militias came to be 
absorbed by or at least identify with the leading Shiite movements, AMAL or Hezbollah. 
In effect, the Israeli repression and contention with the Palestinians created a political 
opportunity, an opening and motive for Shiite mobilization.  
                                                 
98 Beydoun, “South Lebanon Border Zone,” 39. 
99  Ibid., 168. 
100  Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a , 50. 
34 
C. IRAQ: SHIITE RESURGENCE UNDER PERSECUTION  
Iraqi Shiites have always been politically marginalized. Though they exercised a 
degree of autonomy under Ottoman rule, mainly a function of the empire’s impotence 
rather than benevolence, they were effectively excluded from political participation under 
British rule and later under that of the Hashemite monarchy. A critical factor to this 
political weakness was the fractious nature of Iraqi Shiites.101 Local interests and 
loyalties, to clan, town, tribe, etc., tended to override identity as a Shiite. Fatwas issued 
by Najafi ulama exhorting their followers to resist the British invasion between 1914 and 
1917 were ineffectual and failed to elicit mass support.102 In short, sectarian allegiance 
was not considered to be one’s primary loyalty. Furthermore, the rural population tended 
to follow local sayyids, rather than the ulama in Najaf or other shrine cities. The ensuing 
procession of Iraqi regimes capitalized upon and exploited these cleavages in order to 
keep the Shiite majority divided and politically ineffectua l.  
The imposition of a state system following the First World War cut the close link 
between Najaf and Iran. Qom gradually replaced Najaf as the most prestigious center of 
Shiite learning, though Arab Shiites still tended to go to Najaf and the other Iraqi shrine 
cities to study rather than going to Iran. 103 This helped widen cleavages between Arab 
and Persian Shiites, but also increased the competition between Arab scholars and local 
sayyids, further splitting the Shiite community.  
The discrimination against Shiite political involvement has been institutionalized 
since the British occupied Iraq during the First World War. The Shiite religious 
establishment vehemently opposed British rule. As discussed above, they issues fatwas 
designed to mobilize armed opposition. To counter this threat the British exiled all non-
Arab ulama from Iraq, greatly weakening the religious establishment and for all 
significant purposes rendering them politically impotent.104 The British were only the 
first in a long line of minority rulers who sought political acquiescence from the Shiites.  
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The Hashemite monarchy continued the British policy, creating a system of 
Sunni-based patronage that Shiites were unable to penetrate. The revolutionary regimes 
were no better.105 Though Qassim’s regime was less brutal as a rule, neither he, nor the 
‘Arif or Ba’ath regimes allowed Shiite inclusion and in many cases institutionalized 
repression.  
The only significant Iraqi Shiite mass movement to emerge before the Islamic 
Revolution was that of the Da’wah party. This movement was founded in the late 1950s 
or early 1960s among the Shiite ulama in the Iraqi shrine cities, particularly Najaf. 106 
Concern had been growing over the years over the decline of piety and religious 
observance among Iraqi Shiites. The growing influence of Marxism, youth attendance at 
secular, state-run schools, and government dissuasion created an environment where 
Shiite practices, and religion in general, were viewed as quaint, but outdated rituals. The 
Da’wah was an attempt on the part of junior ulama and pious Najafi bourgeoisie to 
reverse this trend.107  
The progenitors of the Da’wah sought to create a comprehensive ideology with 
which to compete with Marxism and Leninism. Interestingly, they consciously imitated 
many of the organizational structures and mobilization methods used by their adversaries, 
correctly noting their utility and the inability of traditional patronage networks to 
compete. The founders, increasingly led by the young ‘alim Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, 
outlined three primary goals: to create a modern party framework to organize, publicize, 
and execute their mission; to consciously plan the future of their movement with a staged 
or phased approach; and to achieve the ultimate goal of an Islamic state.108    
The Da’wah acted modestly before the Iranian revolution. During this period they 
focused on education and the organization of religious observances.109 It was mainly the 
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latter activity that brought them into contention with the state. The ‘Arif regime sought to 
revitalize Sunni public life, while the Ba’ath discouraged religious activity generally. In 
both cases the regime was not willing to accept Shiite mass religious observances and 
resorted to repressive measures to prevent them.  
Though they intended to educate and revitalize Shiite piety, the practical function 
of the Da’wah before the Iranian revolution was to counter state-sponsored repression of 
religious observances and protect those who participated. The ‘Arif regime (1963-66) and 
especially the Ba’ath (post 1968) were particularly oppressive and elicited significant, if 
generally ineffectual, opposition by the party. 110 In particular the 1974 Husaini 
processions and the 1977 processions between Najaf and Karbala were attacked by 
government forces. In both cases the Da’wah led the resulting riots and other opposition 
activities. Recognizing that some accommodation would be needed, Saddam Hussein 
publicly supported the Ba’ath Party’s commitment to freedom of religion, appeared and 
participated in various Shiite rituals, and was able to co-opt significant numbers of ulama 
through state contributions to religious infrastructure and charities. The flip side was that 
he would not tolerate political movements hiding behind the façade of religion, an open 
ended license to apply force as he saw fit. Prominent Da’wah members were arrested 
throughout the 1970s.  
The Da’wah was in search of leadership and eventually found it in the person of 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Though relatively junior, Sadr was attractive for a variety of 
reasons.111 He was a founding member of the Da’wah party as well as being a respected 
intellectual and scholar. Also of considerable importance was that he was one of the few 
Arab ulama involved in the movement. Perhaps most importantly, more senior ulama 
preferred to remain aloof from politics and refused to join.  
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was a watershed event for the Da’wah. Excited by 
the successful movement in Iran, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr thought the moment for 
revolution had also come to Iraq. He embraced Khomeini and the concept of the wilayet 
e-faqih. His actions placed him firmly in Khomeini’s camp and made him a target of state 
                                                 
110  Batatu, "Shi'i organizations in Iraq," 190-94. 
111  Faleh A. Jabbar, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq, 227. 
37 
repression. The first such activity was the declaration of a three day holiday in Najaf’s 
religious schools to commemorate the Islamic Revolution. 112 During their time off, the 
students organized a peaceful protest march in which they carried pro-Khomeini banners. 
The march was targeted for state repression and many students were injured or arrested. 
Though neither the Da’wah nor Sadr appear to have been directly involved, Sadr 
implicated himself by leading negotiations with the government for the release of arrested 
students.  
Increased tension with the government and internal Da’wah politics quickly 
became a problem for Sadr. Party leadership became reluctant at times to incite protests 
so Sadr began using his wukala’, his personal organization used to collect tithes and carry 
out charity work, to organize and lead protests.113 A competition then emerged between 
the Da’wah and wukala’ activists to produce the largest and most effective marches, 
eventually motivating each side to take ever increasingly dangerous risks. Sadr became 
concerned that the competition would lead to exposure to government secret services; he 
was right. Ba’ath security forces observed the activists and effectively identified them as 
well as the movement’s organization.  
In June 1979 Sadr was arrested, but his organization was allowed to remain in 
place and under clandestine observation. A series of mass protests and riots ensued, as 
well as widespread international pressure against the Ba’ath regime’s actions. Sadr was 
soon released but kept under house arrest. Four to five thousand members of Sadr’s 
wukala’ as well as many other activists were jailed and over two hundred executed.114 
With the organization destroyed the surviving activists resorted to a bombing campaign, 
but its effects were not coordinated and were ineffective. In March 1980, membership in 
the Da’wah party was declared to be punishable by death. Sadr was arrested and later 
killed on the 8th or 9th of April. Additionally, over 15,000 Iraqis of Iranian decent were 
expelled from the country, despite the fact that they had lived in Iraq for generations.115 
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The next major Shiite uprising occurred in the immediate aftermath of the 1990-
91 Gulf War when retreating Iraqi units revolted while passing through the southern 
cities of Abu al-Khasib and al-Zubair three days after the surrender to the United 
States.116 Unlike the 1979-80 protest movement, however, the riots of March 1991 were 
both unorganized and unsustainable. Both domestic and expatriate groups had been 
advocating just such a populist uprising through the Iran-Iraq War and beyond, but most 
had long since given up hope. In the event, no organization was prepared to capitalize on 
the quick gains achieved by what amounted to leaderless mobs.117 The Ba’ath regime 
unleashed the Republican Guard against the rebellious regions, a conscious decision to 
implement indiscriminate slaughter. Estimates place the death toll as high as 300,000.118 
Despite the dramatic and tragic events, the 1991 uprising cannot be classified as a 
social movement. It was instead an extended protest, brought about in response to a 
perceived political opportunity, the apparent collapse of the Ba’ath regime. There was no 
organization or structure with which to mobilize resources and no leadership to frame the 
uprising in terms that would resonate. Unlike examples of mobilization, in which 
informal networks advance shared goals, the Shiite uprising was typified by spontaneous 
activism following the example of mutinous Iraqi Army units. It was not built upon social 
networks and lacked a unifying goal other than regime change. The contemporaneous 
Kurdish uprising did not suffer from these handicaps. Though beyond the scope of this 
inquiry, that movement was more unified and arose through the effort of organized 
political groups with distinct political objectives.   
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Political opportunity is a necessary component of a viable social movement. All 
three cases exhibited an apparent opportunity for action, empowered by exclusive 
political systems and indiscriminate repression of government opposition. As discussed 
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in Chapter I, the Iranian revolution provided a catalyst, providing proof that activism 
could succeed as well as providing material support.  
Hezbollah in particular benefited from Iranian largess, but also gained 
ideologically and tactically from the association. The Lebanese movement mobilized in 
response to rampant insecurity and the state’s inability to provide protection. Within this 
security vacuum the ulama emerged as a group that could provide security and social 
services for their communities.  
Bahrain benefited mostly from the demonstration effect , that even a strong state 
could be compelled through popular action. The movement in Bahrain arose in response 
to the repeal of political rights, as defined in the 1973 constitution and the indiscriminate 
repression of those seeking to achieve political reform. The Shiite ulama rose to lead the 
movement due to their informal organization, considerable resources, and effective 
framing.  
The Iranian revolution seemed to be a decisive moment for the Da’wah by 
providing an impetus for revolution, but Baqir al-Sadr failed to recognize that the specific 
and complex factors at work in Iran were not reproduced in Iraq. Broad-based populist 
support was not present in Iraq, even among the Shiites. The powerful alliance of the 
ulama, bourgeoisie, and elites that was present in Iran did not exist in Iraq. The ulama, 
though still influential, had been severely limited financially and in terms of public 
activism by the Ba’ath regime. Most importantly, the perception of regime instability was 
false. Unlike Iran, the Iraqi government took brutal and decisive action to put down the 
uprising.  
In the case of Hezbollah and in Bahrain, the movements were successful. 
Hezbollah rapidly became an important player on the Lebanese stage, eventually 
becoming the only Muslim power to force an Israeli withdrawal without concessions. In 
Bahrain, the desired political reforms were basically granted by the Khalifah regime. In 
both these cases political opportunity was seized upon by a robust mobilization structure 
that adequately framed their movement. These factors will be discussed in the next two 
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III. MOBILIZATION STRUCTURES 
Organization is necessary to sustain a social movement, transforming it from an 
ad hoc riot or protest into a viable political tool. Mobilization structure refers to both the 
organization needed to recruit and sustain members, and to the mechanisms for raising 
funding and other resources. This chapter identifies these structures in each case.  
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Shiite social movements that 
emerged in Bahrain, Lebanon, and Iraq were forced to operate in an environment devoid 
of meaningful political participation and were subject to constant repression. This 
environment provides three factors that encourage the development of loosely structured 
organizations with exclusive membership policies.119 The threat of government 
infiltration requires movements to develop mechanisms so that only trustworthy people 
are recruited. This threat encourages exclusive recruitment, usually from members’ 
informal circles of friends, family, or other close associates. The threat of decisive defeat 
is another critical influence; the movement cannot allow itself to be wiped out by a single 
government raid. This threat forces movements in repressive environments to 
decentralize, often according to the insurgent’s classic cellular structure. The threat of 
defection is the final critical influence. While operating in a repressive environment, the 
defection of a key member could precipitate the movement’s destruction. This threat 
further encourages a decentralized, cellular structure so that no one member knows 
enough to destroy the entire organization, but it also encourages the indoctrination of 
members to inculcate strong group loyalties.  
Recognizing that creating a movement organization ex nihilo is extremely 
difficult, Charles Kurzman asserts that social movements often co-opt existing 
organizations.120 Furthermore, he delineates four factors that make an organization more 
or less susceptible to such cooptation. First, the organizations have well established 
hierarchies that provide training, indoctrination, and a sense of identity to their members. 
Such hierarchies have formal and informal social networks and provide places for 
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members to meet. Most importantly, members feel a sense of inclusion and loyalty to the 
institution. Second, these organizations have a wealth of ideological or theological 
resources with which to frame the movement. Third, conducive organizations are 
autonomous from the state, independent both in the appointment of officials and the 
collection of revenue. Fourth, these organizations rely on their constituents for resources 
rather than external benefactors. When combined, these factors make an organization a 
suitable vehicle for social mobilization. The critical remaining dynamic is “organizational 
opportunity.” According to Kurzman, this opportunity occurs when either the 
organization’s leadership is in favor of social activism, or is unable to punish those within 
the organization who are willing to act and bring the hierarchy’s resources to bear in that 
effort.121 Without sufficient organizational opportunity, an institution will remain 
resistant to being co-opted by a social movement.  
In Iraq and especially Bahrain, there was sufficient organizational opportunity 
within the Shiite hierarchy to permit cooptation of the whole by internal activist fringe 
elements. Significant portions, if not the totality, of the Shiite hierarchy became involved 
and eventually superseded the original movement leadership. The Shiite establishment 
was particularly suited to cooptation due to a robust infrastructure for private gatherings, 
informal recruitment mechanisms, and a source of revenue independent from the state. 
Addit ionally, Shi’ism remains a source of framing that particularly resonates with its 
constituents; this factor will be discussed in Chapter IV. Lebanon had a slightly different 
experience, though Hezbollah did benefit greatly from the established charity system led 
by Sayyid Fadlallah. The primary difference was that in the early years Hezbollah 
received extensive financial and military aid from Iran, a factor that helped overcome the 
difficulty of initial resource mobilization. Hezbollah also benefited from the lack of an 
authoritarian regime capable of effective repression, a situation that allowed more public 
mobilization than the other case studies. When combined with favorable political 
opportunity, the effective mobilization structures adopted in the three cases completed the 
circuit that enables sustainable social mobilization.  
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A. BAHRAIN: ULAMA COOPTATION OF A SECULAR MOVEMENT 
The Shiites of Bahrain are not homogenous in ethnicity or social class.122 Known 
as al-Baharna, the oldest residents of Bahrain are of Persian decent. More recently, Arab 
Shiites from the al-Ahsa Province of Saudi Arabia have immigrated. This ethnic cleavage 
has traditionally been divisive and has been exploited by the minority Sunni regime in 
order to maintain its power. Class is also a profound fault line and has had an important 
effect in coalition building among political activists. Class divisions have played an 
important role in the history of Bahraini political contention. 123 Virtually all of Bahrain’s 
poorest are Shiite, but there also exists a sizable middle class minority, well represented 
in the private sector and as lower- level bureaucrats. The most notable achievement of the 
Shiite movement in Bahrain was its ability to overcome these contentious divisions.  
Bahrain experienced an upsurge in Shiite-perpetrated acts of terror during the 
1980s in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. Such operations were generally grand in 
scale and carried out by small, well trained and funded underground cells.124 Support 
from Iran, which sought to spread the Islamic Revolution throughout the Gulf Region, 
was a poorly concealed secret. These efforts, however, were the result of Iranian initiative 
and fostered Khomeini’s political goals rather than attempting to redress Bahraini 
grievances.125 This movement sputtered out, its Iran-centric focus failing to attract 
widespread support.  
The opposition movement central to this study began in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War (1990-91) as a secular, cross-sectarian attempt to restore the National Assembly and 
remove the official state of emergency, in place since 1975.126 Led primarily by 
intellectuals and disenfranchised elites, its initial tactic was a petition campaign. 
Throughout the early-1990s a series of petitions were circulated among Bahrainis before 
being submitted to the emir. Some were signed only by elites, others by a large number of 
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common people. The government response was to accept the petition politely and then 
order repressive measures against participants.  
The Shiite ulama gradually gained influence in the movement, eventually 
exercising near total control. The primary mechanism by which this was accomplished 
relied on the series of matams throughout the country. 127 Numbering about four hundred, 
these institutions are meeting places for Shiite to mourn their dead, but they also have 
extensive additional use as social, political, and educational meeting places.128 The most 
influential tool of the matam is its trust fund. Each matam collects its own donations, and 
then distributes goods and services to needy members. Such funds are independent of 
government control and emphasize the state’s lack of effective public service institutions. 
This helped delineate the dichotomy between state apathy and lack of welfare apparatus 
on one hand, and the positive, tangible aid of the Shiite community on the other.  This 
self-help welfare system acted to build a cohesive Shiite society, alienated and in 
opposition to the state, that eroded the traditional ethnic and class rivalries.  
A profound consequence of the matams’ success is the power it gave to the 
ulama, many of them young and full of Iranian revolutionary ideology. 129 These clerics 
were responsible for managing the trust funds and had the discretion to direct the flow of 
money.  As the primary benefactor of the poor and disenfranchised, the ulama had a 
receptive audience for their political and social agenda. A key factor for their success was 
that they continued to advocate the original political goals of representative government. 
While the rhetoric took on a Shiite flavor, they avoided alienating moderates and Sunnis 
who would view an Iranian style revolution as unfavorable.  
Thus, the opposition movement began among elites and ulama, but was 
successfully disseminated to the people by primarily religious institutions. There were 
several prominent leaders in the movement, Sheikh al-Jamri in particular, but the 
hierarchy was fairly horizontal. Religious credentials and persuasiveness were more 
instrumental than titles and rank. The leadership certainly exercised control, but not in a 
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strictly military way. The ulama were very astute at starting their own demonstrations or 
gaining control of those that arose spontaneously.   
 
B. LEBANON: SHIITE AND PLO FRICTION; IDF REPRISALS 
Following the defeat of Arab forces in the Six Days War of 1967, the PLO shifted 
from a strategy centered for the most part on conventional tactics to a guerilla campaign 
against Israel. 130 As such, states bordering Israel became the primary front in their 
struggle, with Jordan and Lebanon as the main Palestinian concentrations. Following the 
defeat and expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in “Black September” 1970, Lebanon 
became the only feasible place from which to launch raids against Israel. An influx of 
Palestinians from Jordan swelled the Lebanese refugee camps in the months following 
that event. With this population shift, claimed to be 100,000 people, also came weapons 
and munitions.131 These were used to train and equip operatives that engaged in cross-
border strikes against Israel.  
While many Southern Lebanese Shiites sympathized with the plight of the 
Palestinians, in practice the influx of refugees was destabilizing and caused a degree of 
resentment. Israel consciously began a campaign to exploit this potential cleavage 
through the use of collective punishment against the Shiites in response to PLO guerilla 
attacks.132 The IDF reasoned that if they made aiding the PLO sufficiently painful, the 
Shiites would choose personal interest over ideology and withdraw support. Generally 
speaking, the Israeli attempt was successful. As discussed in Chapter II, the Israelis 
launched a series of attacks targeting both PLO forces and infrastructure, but also 
affecting the local Lebanese Shiites. The brief invasion in September 1972 following the 
massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games and 1978’s Operation Litani 
are prime examples. Additionally, artillery barrages and air strikes were a common 
occurrence.133 To protect themselves against IDF reprisals, villages began organizing 
militias whose mission was to keep Palestinians out. Over time these militias came to                                                  
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identify with, and often affiliated themselves with AMAL to better resist external threats, 
both from Palestinians and the IDF.134  
The Israeli 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Operation Peace for Galilee, was a critical 
event for Shiite mobilization. Though Hala Jabar asserts that the initial reaction from 
Shiites was fairly positive towards the invasion, they saw it as a solution to the 
Palestinian issue, feelings eventually soured.135 AMAL took a moderate stance with 
respect to the invasion. Jabar argues that,  
Ironically, Israel, Berri, and the southern Shiites all wanted the same thing 
– an end to the Palestinian presence and guerrilla activity in South 
Lebanon, as well as security across both borders.136 
 
Within a few months, however, the IDF began to lose what little support they had. 
The Israelis began organizing Lebanese militias under their own command. Shiites were 
pressured into joining, though leadership positions tended to be reserved for Christians. A 
variety of methods were used to compel recruitment. One method was to offer 
employment in Israel to one family member of a militiaman. Such workers could earn 
significantly more money in Israel than they could in Lebanon, so such initiatives were 
persuasive. A more negative tactic amounted to hostage taking; the IDF would compel 
volunteerism by holding family members in prison. Concurrent with these militia efforts, 
viewed to be preparations for a long-term stay, rumors proliferated that Israel intended to 
annex Lebanese territory up to the Litani River. The combination of these factors created 
a perception of Israeli permanence and changed the Israeli’s role from tacit acceptance as 
a liberator from the Palestinians to a foreign invader.137 
The Shiite resistance during the latter half of 1982 until October 1983 achieved 
minor success.138 The movement was largely unorganized and spontaneous in nature. 
The various village militias operated with little coordination, but nevertheless were able 
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to inflict an average of one Israeli casualty per day. Through this period the ulama 
remained fairly uninvolved. Those of lesser stature participated at the local level, but few 
notables were directly involved and there was little coordination by the Shiite hierarchy. 
This changed following the IDF repression of an ashura procession in Nabatiyeh on 
October 16, 1983.139 In an attempt to break up the procession of approximately fifty-
thousand people, the Israelis drove convoys through the crowds and eventually opened 
fire, killing several Shiites.  
In response, Sheikh Muhammad Mehdi Shams al-Din issued a fatwa encouraging 
civil resistance against the Israeli occupation. 140 In typical fashion the IDF responded to 
the spike in violence with increased repression, most notably the Israelis isolated the 
south from Beirut, severing a vital economic linkage.141 Without the Beirut markets, 
southern Shiite farmers were unable to sell their produce. This economic hardship further 
radicalized the southern Shiites. The ulama began assuming increasingly influential roles 
in the resistance, attempting to unify the disparate groups into an effective force that was 
seeking common objectives. Most of these clerics, as a rule very young, were trained in 
Najaf and were sympathetic to Khomeini. As the fight ensued, the southern Shiites 
became more radical than their AMAL leadership and resulted in a schism. This seems to 
be a function of the intersection of increasing adherence to Khomeini’s vision and the 
brutal nature of the insurgency – the AMAL leadership was more moderate with respect 
to Israel because they were not in active conflict with them.  
During this period the nascent Hezbollah remained underground, not publicly 
proclaiming itself until 1985. The movement received a great impetus however, in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1982 invasion. Several leading Lebanese ulama were in Iran 
when the invasion occurred and were immediately offered aid by the Islamic Republic. 
Led by the aforementioned young clerics, the movement began training operations in out 
of the way Shiite strongholds such as the Bekaa Valley, as well as sending people for 
training to Iran or Iran’s Damascus embassy. 142 When operational, these operatives 
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avoided revelation of their origins, instead claiming loyalty to various organizations 
under AMAL’s sphere of influence. The result was raids being conducted by mysterious 
Shiite radicals whose organization and objectives were for the most part unknown.  
What resulted was, in effect, a movement with two major groups – those derived 
from the local militias, and those from the Iranian-trained core. The ulama was the 
critical factor in bringing these groups together in the years following the 1982 invasion. 
Several factors facilitated their importance. The first was their ties to Iran, whose 
theocracy supported the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. The shared 
ideology precipitated the vast amount of political and material support that Iran 
provided. This source of revenue and supply independent of indigenous means was a 
great asset, allowing Hezbollah to mobilize more rapidly than if they had had to extract 
these resources from the local populous.  
The second factor facilitating the ulama’s central role was the use of the Shiite 
religious establishment. As Kurzman argued in his discussion of organizations being co-
opted by social movements, the Shiite hierarchy was uniquely suited for such a role. The 
fact that the clerical leadership was generally in agreement with the idea of the Islamic 
State and the repulsion of Israel created favorable organizational opportunity. Its vast 
network of gathering places and charities, independence from the state, and independent 
funding from Iran all made for a powerful ally for the movement. A key point is that the 
hierarchy and Hezbollah remained distinct and separate, though often in close collusion. 
They were mutually supportive without completely yielding to each other. As in the other 
two case studies, the ulama’s ability to reach the public through preaching was an 
invaluable tool. In mosques, Husayniyyas, funerals, or any other gathering of the faithful, 
the ulama took the opportunity to spread their message and garner support for the 
effort.143 Additionally, the Shiite faith provided a robust corpus of symbology to frame 
the movement, a topic discussed in Chapter IV.  
In addition to the effectiveness of the ulama’s ability to raise support, the 
importance of Hezbollah’s chain-of-command cannot be overemphasized. Using the 
insurgent’s time honored technique of decentralization, Hezbollah adopted a command 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 51. 
49 
structure consciously designed to resist leadership decapitation. The movement was led 
by a small committee, with no one person able to decisively affect policy decisions. 
While it did introduce a degree of inefficiency, it also mitigated the loss posed by any one 
leader if he should be killed. Such concerns were valid. When the IDF realized the 
leadership being exercised by the ulama, they began a campaign of arrests and 
assassinations; efforts that proved to be effective for little more than the creation of 
martyrs.144  
Hezbollah benefited from a variety of factors during their initial mobilization. The 
ulama were central to the effort. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and their repressive and 
seemingly long-term measures created a political opportunity that the radical Shiite 
clergy capitalized on.  
 
C. IRAQ: COUNTERING SECULARIZATION; PROTECTING THE FAITH 
The Shiite movement in Iraq began around 1960 in the form of the Da’wah party. 
The impetus and initial focus of the Da’wah’s activism was the relative decline of the 
Shiite establishment with respect to the secular state. The Hashemite monarchy, the ‘Arif 
and Qassim regimes, and eventually the Ba’ath regime were all secularly oriented. What 
religious influence there was derived from the Sunni tradition and Shiite practices were at 
best ignored, and consciously suppressed in more troubling times. Da’wah activists 
tended to be young and idealistic, throwing off the trappings of traditional political 
quietism. Until the Iranian revolut ion the focus of effort was on education and the 
protection of Shiites practicing their religious obligations, such as the ashura processions.  
As asserted in the previous chapter, the Shiites of Iraq have historically been 
fractured politically. Loyalty most often lay with local tribal or religious officials, with 
the formal ulama of the shrine cities playing a fairly minor role in most peoples’ day to 
day religious or political calculus.145 These cleavages were often exploited by the 
successive Iraqi regimes to keep the Shiites divided and passive. The ulama activists of 
the Da’wah would struggle to overcome these divisions within their potential 
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constituency in an effort to unify the Shiite community and revitalize the practice of their 
faith. Concern over the future of Shiite religiosity was valid; in the decades prior to 1960 
the numbers of seminary students had plummeted, attendance of religious ceremonies 
was down, and political minded Shiites had been drawn to a variety of socialist or 
communist parties.146 
One of the most significant cleavages was the division between the urban and 
rural Shiites. The urban Shiites were more in tune with orthodox Shi’ism and tended to 
belong to the merchant class. They sought to distance themselves from the state apparatus  
as much a practicable, resulting in an under representation in the public sector 
bureaucracy and officer ranks. Serving a Sunni government was considered an unseemly 
profession. 147 Rural Shiites were relatively recent converts, most having adopted Shi’ism 
toward the end of the 19th century. While they were drawn to the comprehensive themes: 
social justice, anti-government outlook, oppression, Hussein’s martyrdom; the rural 
Shiites had little interest of or knowledge about the loftier intellectual or spiritua l aspects 
of the religion. 148 These two Shiite groups had little contact or interaction until the 
beginning of a rural to urban migration that started in the early-20th century and 
continued into the 1960s. The rural Shiites settled in urban slums, particularly those of 
Baghdad, continuing their separation from their urban coreligionists. A similar migration 
phenomenon was repeated in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. These communities 
became the demographic center of Shiite political activism and the primary font of 
Da’wah followers.149 
Instead of adopting the decentralized, cellular, and informal mobilization structure 
evident in Bahrain and Lebanon, the Iraqi activists formed along a more hierarchic 
framework. At the apex was a small committee that guided the movement, but none had 
enough personal popularity to exercise decisive leadership. Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr 
was eventually solicited to assume this role. Though relatively young and junior in the 
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Shiite hierarchy, his scholarship was well respected, he was one of the few Arab clerics, 
no one more senior would accept the position, and most importantly, he was willing.150  
A fatal division developed, however, in the relationship between Baqir al-Sadr 
and the Da’wah party. Al-Sadr saw in the Iranian revolution an opportunity to lead Iraq 
into a similar direction. He declared that the Da’wah was “going public” and would arm 
themselves to contest Ba’ath control of the state.151 The party, Baqir al-Sadr in particular, 
adopted the philosophy of the wilayet e-faqih and sought to bring about its 
implementation in Iraq. The party leadership became uncomfortable with Baqir al-Sadr’s 
revolutionary leadership and sought to tone down his actions. Being unable to rely on his 
party activists, Baqir al-Sadr began using his wukala’ (charity organization) to organize 
protests and riots. Not to be outdone, Da’wah activists then began trying to organize 
protests as well. A competition emerged between the two organizations; an effort to lead 
bigger protests than the other groups. Increased competition led both groups to take 
greater risks, eventually allowing themselves to be compromised by Ba’athist internal 
security forces. Baqir al-Sadr eventually recognized this danger, but was unable to 
recover from the error.152  
The Iraqi movement was effectively destroyed in Iraq (though many activists fled 
to Iran or the West) due in large part to its hierarchic structure and internal rivalries. The 
Da’wah was fairly successful during the 1960s-70s because the state allowed it to be. 
While the party was adversarial toward the government, it stayed within certain bounds. 
As soon as it stepped over the line and began inciting protests to achieve regime change, 
the state stepped in with brutal repression and destroyed the organization. The indigenous  
movement never fully recovered. Most prominent activists that survived fled the country 
and Saddam Hussein effectively used his security apparatus to curtail the movement’s 
reconstitution. If the Da’wah had adopted a cellular structure they would have been better 
able to resist these efforts and could have plausibly survived state repression.   
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D. CONCLUSION 
Mobilization structures are a fundamental factor to the development and 
sustainability of a social movement. In each of these case studies, the Shiite ulama and its 
hierarchy played a central organizational role. The clerical establishment in each country 
experienced a sufficient degree of Kurzman’s “organizational opportunity,” a state in 
which the organization’s leadership is either in favor of adopting a movement’s agenda, 
or is incapable of policing itself so that cooptation does not occur.  
The Bahraini movement organized through informal networks associated with 
religious institutions. Through mosques, matams, and study groups, the ulama recruited 
and led their activists. The decentralized organization and intimacy between members 
made state infiltration particularly difficult. Originally led by disenfranchised elites, the 
ulama co-opted the movement through their superior ability to organize members, 
provide funding, and frame the political goals in terms that resonated with the masses.  
In Lebanon, the Shiites initially mobilized to achieve political representation 
commensurate with their proportion of the population. As the country descended into the 
chaos of the civil war, parties and villages developed self-help militias, the precursors of 
Hezbollah, in order to provide security. A significant number of ulama broke from 
AMAL’s tacit acceptance of the Israeli invasion and sought to lead the resistance efforts. 
They were aided in this effort by an infusion of Iranian political and material support, by 
their ability to effectively draw upon Shiite symbology, and their network of charity 
organizations that helped win the support of the masses. Unique among this study’s 
cases, Hezbollah’s acceptance of Iranian funding allowed rapid mobilization of militants 
by offering salaries.  
In Iraq the Da’wah party organized as a result of growing feelings among the 
ulama that the faith was under siege from increasing state-sponsored secularism. 
Founding members were primarily ulama with a substantial minority of pious lay 
activists. Through the 1960s and 1970s the Da’wah primarily worked to protect public 
religious observances. Not until the Iranian revolution did the Da’wah make a concerted 
effort to gain populist support and lead large anti-regime protests. As a result, the attempt 
to capitalize upon the inspiration provided by the Iranian revolution lacked wide-spread 
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initial support, suffered from insufficient resources, and was easily penetrated by state 
security agents.  
Mobilization structures and political opportunity are intertwined, each affecting 
the other. A particular political opportunity might favor one mobilization structure over 
others, or vice versa. The addition of framing is necessary to fully explore this dynamic. 
As Kurzman argues, a robust source of frames makes a particular mobilization structure 
more attractive to cooptation. Framing, the subject of the next chapter, shapes available 
mobilization structures and political opportunities, sometimes to the extreme extent of 





























This chapter examines rhetoric, press releases, ideology, and establishment  
counter- frames to identify and evaluate the framing strategies used by each movement. 
Mobilizing symbols are often as important to a social movement as resources. It is these 
symbols that catch the imagination or sensibilities of neutrals and motivate commitment 
to changing the status quo. Choosing and properly publicizing these frames are continual 
struggles for a nascent movement. Tarrow argues that “The major symbolic dilemma of 
social movements is to mediate between inherited symbols that are familiar, but lead to 
passivity, and new ones that are electrifying, but may be too unfamiliar to lead to 
action.”153 Thus, the struggle is to find frames traditional enough to resonate, but radical 
enough to motivate action; all the while resisting counter-framing from the status quo 
establishment and competitors.  
In all three case studies the opposition adopted the symbols of Shiite Islam. This 
choice was not necessarily an obvious one; in all the cases the Shiite community was 
divided by many cleavages, with most people identifying with local issues rather than 
membership in a larger Shiite community. However, Shiite symbology proved to be an 
intelligent choice. The history of Shi’ism is rife with the dichotomy between oppressors 
and oppressed and the deep concern for social justice. Hampered by traditional quietism, 
Shiite activism began to become accepted through the ideological works of Shari’ati and 
Khomeini who made a convincing case for actively striving for a better future. As the 
acknowledged experts in Shiite learning, the ulama were in the ideal position to frame the 
movements in theological terms, greatly expanding the ability of the movement to attract 
popular support. Moreover, the ulama had traditionally been a buffer between the ruling 
class (the oppressors or the elite) and the masses (the oppressed). Leading an anti-
establishment movement could easily be justified within the bounds of their traditional 
societal role.  
Social movements must formulate internal and external frames. Internal frames 
are those that are targeted at existing organization members and supporters to reinforce 
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and continue their support for the movement. External frames are those that are intended 
to influence non-members, whether foreign states, international public opinion, or the 
unaligned domestic public. The relative importance of internal and external frames varies 
between movements. External frames were extremely important for the movement in 
Bahrain, while internal frames were emphasized in the case of Hezbollah. The Da’wah 
generally did a poor job framing their struggle in Iraq, though what did occur tended to 
focus on the external. Attracting and retaining members has obvious implications for a 
social movement, an important factor for success made even more difficult in an 
oppressive environment where membership carries with it significant risk.  
 
A. BAHRAIN: IRANIAN PROXIES VS. ANTI-DEMOCRATS 
The Shiite ulama were the primary providers of opposition rhetoric in Bahrain. 
They spread their views through the formal medium of sermons and informally through 
the matam system. Shiite imagery became increasingly important as the movement 
mobilized. The Shiite identity as a persecuted minority and their rich tradition of the 
oppressor versus the oppressed responded perfectly to the state sponsored repression.  
As discussed above, the opposition in Bahrain started as a secular, cross-sectarian 
movement advocating the restoration of the constitution. The poor economy, its 
disproportional effect on the Shiite population, and the lack of effective government 
response acted to catalyze the movement. When combined, this fight against an 
oppressive Sunni minority for human rights, political representation, and economic 
prosperity fit neatly into the ideology of the Iranian Revolution. 
As the ulama became more active in the opposition movement, they increasingly 
used Shiite terminology and symbolism to frame the struggle. Many of the younger 
clerics had studied in Iran and had adopted Khomeini’s philosophy. 154 Most attractive in 
the Bahraini context was the idea of Islam as social justice. This played on the traditional 
Shiite role as a persecuted minority, forced to endure the rapaciousness of the Sunni 
majority. The idea that one should take action, empowered by religion, to correct this 
millenarian social injustice, rather than endure it, was revolutionary. Those who perished 
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as the result of state repression were now martyrs, slain defending their beliefs and 
striving for a better world.  
Though the opposition increasingly framed their effort in religious terms, there 
was still an effort to appeal to a cross-sectarian audience. The desired end-state never 
wavered from restoration of the National Assembly as a mechanism for limiting the 
absolute rule of the Khalifah. 155 Even the radical elements recognized the need for broad 
based support and at least paid lip service to the inclusive nature of the movement’s 
secular goals. The appeal to moderates is one of the key factors of this movement’s 
success, especially in contrast to the failure of the militant Shiite extremism of the 1980s. 
During this period, attempts to foment a Shiite uprising were transparently pro-Iranian 
and failed to address local concerns.156 Carrying out Iranian foreign policy goals did not 
appeal to the Bahraini masses, further reinforcing my contention that while Arab Shiites 
looked to the Iranian revolution as a positive example of revolution and were willing to 
accept aid, they were not willing to accept Iranian sovereignty. When it emerged in the 
1990s, the constitutional movement effectively had no ties with the Islamic republic. The 
ulama disseminated a message that was generally consistent with that of the Iranian 
revolution, but whose central goals addressed local concerns. The propaganda war 
between the state and its opposition for the support of moderates would become the 
decisive battle of the revolt.  
The state consistently and adamantly attempted to frame the opposition as an 
Iranian proxy.157 The intent was to paint the opposition as a strictly Shiite sectarian 
movement driven by religious goals. If effective, this would have accomplished several 
tasks. First, and most importantly, it would solidify the fault line between Sunnis and 
Shiites, thereby fracturing the broad based support the movement needed. Second, it 
attempted to exploit cleavages within the Shiite community: Persian versus Arab 
ethnicity, moderate versus radical. Third, it neatly avoided legitimizing the question of 
political and economic reform by not responding to them as the point of contention. 
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Advocating Iranian involvement in the international media played off Western fears of 
Shiite Islamism and preempted protest over the repressive measures used to combat it. In 
effect, framing the movement as foreign- inspired religious fanaticism gave the state a 
freer hand to use coercive force.  
A key difference between the Bahraini movement and the Lebanese and Iraqi 
movements was the deliberate use of frames geared toward international opinion. While 
certainly not absent in Lebanon and Iraq, the Bahrainis, both regime and opposition, 
continually focused on leveraging international opinion to defeat the others legitimacy 
and support. The large American footprint, notably the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet 
Headquarters in Manama, dramatically increased the importance of the movement’s 
outcome to the United States and therefore the importance of each side in gaining 
American support. The opposition sought to frame their movement as a struggle towards 
democracy. 158 They were simply disenfranchised minorities seeking to restore their 
constitutional rights at the expense of a tyrannical minority. They publicly sought to 
distance themselves from Iranian objectives, continually stressing their commitment to 
democracy and reform. The regime seized on the Shiite membership of the movement 
and sought to frame them as Iranian proxies seeking to establish a fundamentalist Islamic 
state.159 Knowing that the United States was committed to staunching the spread of 
Islamic fundamentalism, particularly the Iranian version, they felt that they would have a 
freer hand to repress the dissidents. International appeals for human rights and democracy 
would be marginalized by American interests in containing Iran. The Bahraini regime 
won the framing war. Despite significant publicity from Western non-governmental 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch, the United States publicly supported the 
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B. LEBANON: TERRORISTS VS. INVADERS  
Hezbollah had the difficult task of attracting members in an environment full of 
competition. During the 1960s-70s, many Lebanese Shiites were attracted to socialist, 
communist, or other left- leaning organizations. Such ideologies focused on class-warfare, 
oppression, and social justice, which resonated with Shiite worldviews.161 Others, 
sympathizing with their plight, joined Palestinian groups. Musa al-Sadr greatly helped 
reverse the sectarian entropy and started a trend towards unification of the Lebanese 
Shiites.162 The emergence of AMAL lured many away from the leftist groups, though the 
Shiites continue to be a community with divided loyalties until the present day. The inter-
organizational struggle for membership and loyalty of the Shiite community is a defining 
feature of the Lebanese Shiite movement.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, tensions rose between Shiites and 
Palestinians in South Lebanon through the 1970s and early-1980s. Self-help militias 
formed that were intended to keep PLO operatives out of Shiite villages so as to prevent 
IDF reprisals.163 As the 1982 invasion wore on and it became apparent that the Israelis 
would not be leaving in the short term, many of these militias formed around the core of 
more radical young clerics that had broken off of AMAL and were receiving support 
from Iran. The Palestinian experience taught the Lebanese that fighting was their only 
hope of maintaining their independence and reclaiming their land.164 Extrapolating from 
the example of Israeli treatment of the Palestinians, the Shiites understood that Israel 
could not be trusted to keep their word if the Lebanese met their terms.  
Hezbollah fundamentally defined themselves as Lebanese patriots committed to 
freeing their nation, culture and religion from the oppression of foreigners.165 They assert 
that,  
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We have opted for religion, freedom, and dignity over humiliation and 
constant submission to America and its allies and to Zionism and their 
Phalangist allies. We have risen to liberate our country, to drive the 
imperialists and the invaders out of it, and to determine our fate by our 
own hands.166 
By Hezbollah’s calculus, the countries of the world were divided into two camps, 
the oppressors and the oppressed. The principal oppressors were the United States and the 
Soviet Union. By the 1980s the superpowers had ceased competing over ideology; both 
capitalism and socialism had failed to deliver the just society they had promised. 
Eventually the ideological struggle was subsumed by the struggle for power. The 
oppressed countries became the prizes in this struggle, taken advantage of, stripped of 
resources and dignity. The answer to oppression was unity: both of the umma among 
themselves and across religious lines, binding together the world’s oppressed.  
Hezbollah benefited from a clear definition of organizational objectives. They 
defined not only their desired end state, but also a more pragmatic proclamation of what 
they would minimally settle for.167 The foremost goal was the withdrawal of Israel from 
Lebanese territory, the Jewish state’s destruction, and the liberation of Jerusalem. This 
would be complimented by withdrawal of all American and allied forces and their 
influence from the country. The submission of the Phalange to just government and 
accountability for their crimes against the Lebanese people followed. Lastly, the 
Lebanese populous would form a government of their choosing, though Hezbollah 
admittedly favored an Islamic state. The pragmatic goals were effectively less extreme 
versions of the aforementioned: the complete withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon; 
domination by neither East nor West; and the formation of a popularly supported 
government. These objectives masterfully blended tangible and achievable goals with 
symbols that resonated with both Shiite and Lebanese sensibilities. The genius of this 
goal was that it was difficult to reject. Who in Lebanon would not want them? This 
commitment helped Hezbollah achieve a broad support base and paved the way (though 
not consciously at this point) for entry into the mainstream political scene following the 
Ta’if accords.  
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The ulama were invaluable in framing Hezbollah’s agenda. Hezbollah’s core 
leadership was comprised mostly of young, radical, and energetic clerics.168 Most had 
studied in Najaf contemporaneously with Khomeini’s residence and were dedicated to his 
philosophy. This had several effects. First, Khomeini’s renunciation of traditional 
quietism encouraged his followers to take an active role in bringing about an Islamic 
state. The success of the Iranian revolution proved the feasibility of establishing such a 
state and Iranian support provided the means.  
Second, these young ulama had a self-conscious framing strategy. Their task was 
to overcome Tarrow’s dilemma of symbology. That is, they had to find symbols 
traditional enough to resonate with their constituency but radical enough to motivate 
action. They explicitly sought to radicalize their followers through broad, uncontroversial 
themes.169 From its inception, Hezbollah’s raison d’ètre was the defeat of the IDF in 
Lebanon and the destruction of the Israeli state. If there is one thing everyone in the Arab 
world can agree on, it is opposition to Israel. Additionally, with the exception of the 
Maronites, the Lebanese public certainly did not welcome the Israeli invasion. By 
framing their movement in these broad and generally acceptable terms, Hezbollah created 
conditions that encouraged popular support that would have been absent had they been 
advocating strictly Shiite goals.  
In the beginning, Hezbollah’s leadership was focused on radicalizing the public, 
promoting and channeling their outrage toward the IDF. Incitement of emotions rather 
than intellectual argument was the goal. 170 Hezbollah’s activist ulama core constantly 
spread their message in mosques, Husayniyyas, and funerals, anywhere they could find a 
crowd. The very fact that it was the ulama leading the movement created frames. The 
clergy was traditionally the buffer between ruler and the ruled, the guarantor of social 
justice. That they were so active put considerable legitimacy behind the effort.   
The complex and monumental figure of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein 
Fadlallah has been an important factor in the framing of Hezbollah’s message. Though 
never directly involved in Hezbollah’s command apparatus, Fadlallah is often referred to 
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as the organization’s “spiritual guide.” Considered the most senior ‘alim in Lebanon, 
Fadlallah possesses significant theological credibility and the vast resources of his charity 
organization. His support for Hezbollah’s goals lends legitimacy to the organization 
among his constituents, many of whom might otherwise be wary of Shiite political 
Islam.171 Fadlallah, though an outspoken critic of Israel and the United States, advocates 
dialogue with other sectarian groups including Sunni Muslims and Christians in order to 
resolve Lebanon’s problems. This in effect moderates the movement. Additionally, he 
concedes that an Islamic state is not viable in the extremely heterogeneous Lebanese 
context.172 This stance facilitated what is perhaps his greatest contribution to the Shiite 
movement, that of internal framing. Fadlallah’s vast credibility enabled Hezbollah to 
retain its radical members while also allowing the organization to move toward the center 
enough to attract secular and moderate supporters.  
Since 1992-93 there has been a divergence between Fadlallah and Hezbollah. 173 
The centerpiece of their disagreement is over recognition of ‘Ali Khamenei as Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s successor. Hezbollah officially recognized Khamenei as their religious 
authority, a stance understandable in light of the party’s reliance on Iranian support. On 
the other hand, Fadlallah refuses to recognize Khamenei, instead he asserted his own 
claim as marja’ taqlid and endeavored to build his own base of support. The 
disagreement between Fadlallah and Tehran has motivated Hezbollah to distance itself, 
though they remain on reasonably good terms and share many common interests.  
Hezbollah gained a great deal of credibility through their social welfare programs. 
As an organization whose self-professed goal was the establishment of an Islamic state, 
Hezbollah considered social programs to be both a religious obligation as well as an 
effective tool to build support and influence among the masses.174 The Lebanese Civil 
War decimated the country’s infrastructure. The Lebanese state, never possessing a 
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significant ability to penetrate into society, became completely impotent. Hezbollah 
stepped into this vacuum and eventually became the most capable provider of public 
services in the country. Though their motives were certainly rooted in the Muslim 
traditions of charity and caring for the community, the move toward public services was 
formulated to attract public and state support for their other activities, most importantly 
their armed struggle against Israel. Unlike Islamic charity organizations in many other 
countries that attempt to use their influence to supplant and delegitimize the state, 
Hezbollah uses their social work to solidify their place within the Lebanese political 
apparatus.175 It is a tool to reinforce their legitimacy within the system rather than an 
attempt to overthrow it. Aiding the common people further reinforces Hezbollah’s 
Islamist credentials as a charity organization seeking to improve the lives of the people.  
An important factor for successful framing is an efficient mechanism for 
conveying one’s story to the public. Various media, each with their own pros and cons, 
are often the most expeditious method to reach large audiences quickly, but assuring 
favorable coverage is problematic. Media outlets have their own motives, tending to 
cover issues the public is interested in. As issues gain or lose the public interest the media 
varies its coverage.176 Hezbollah neatly avoided this problem by establishing its own 
media outlets, including television, radio, and newspapers.177 Through these fora the 
party could provide its own views on any given subject to a large number of viewers, 
both offering sympathetic coverage to their own projects while deriding the opposition’s. 
Hezbollah leadership is able to make public announcements to advocate or explain their 
positions, an option that is particularly rare among opposition movements.  
Hezbollah proved itself to be extremely astute in its framing strategy. This effort 
was aided by the party’s simple and generally popular mission statement: drive Israel 
from Lebanese soil. A combination of nationalist and religious symbols was drawn upon 
to frame their struggle. Shiites were attracted to the eternal search for social justice and 
the battle of the oppressed against the oppressors. To the international community 
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Hezbollah attempted to frame their struggle as a war of national liberation, the right of 
national self-determination being considered an important and inalienable right.178 
Similar to the Bahraini example, religious symbols were drawn upon to facilitate the 
achievement of what is essential a secular goal, the control over a given territory.  
 
C. IRAQ: BA’ATHIST ATHEISM VS. PERSIAN EXTREMISTS  
The Iraqi Shiite movement was focused in the intellectual and religious schools of 
the shrine cities, the hawza. The Iraqi movement was similar to that of Bahrain in that the 
disenfranchised majority was seeking political rights. Unlike Bahrain the Iraqi movement 
lacked clear and specific objectives. The ulama in Iraq was seeking to lead a reform of 
the Shiite community, bringing them back to their roots and protecting them from 
dangerous yet seductive secular ideologies. As the Iraqi regime became increasingly 
confrontational, the Shiite movement, in the form of the Da’wah party, sought to protect 
Shiite religious observances and movement members from persecution. It was only in the 
weeks and months following the successful Iranian revolution that the Da’wah and 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr were able to truly mobilize mass support and demonstrations 
for political objectives.  
As discussed in previous chapters, the Iraqi Da’wah party was founded to combat 
the declining role of the Shiite ulama, and Shiite religion generally, in Iraqi society. 179 
Absent a unified theory to explain their substandard status in the increasingly secular and 
Sunni dominated Iraqi state, many Shiites were attracted to the Communist Party with 
their focus on equality and social justice. The Communist refrain of the oppressed rising 
up to overthrow the oppressors resonated with Shiite sensibilities. This trend encouraged 
the ulama to take a more active political role if they wished to retain their status as 
leaders in their community. This advocacy can also be viewed as part of the broader 
movement in the Muslim world during the 1950s and 1960s to combat the growing 
secularization of the region.  
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The Shiite movement in Iraq relied almost exclusively upon the intellectual 
foundation created by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.180 His two major works, Our 
Philosophy (1959) and Our Economics (1961), attempted to offer Muslims an alternative 
to the capitalist and communist paradigms.181 In particular, the works focus on refuting 
communism, his major competitor for constituents. This theory was universalist, 
providing a compelling, intellectually rigorous, and complete world view that could lead 
Muslims out from domination by “East and West.”  
Through the 1960s and 1970s the Da’wah framed its agenda as that of reformer; 
the straight path to a just society was through Islam arguing that the promises of 
capitalism and communism were false and merely an extension of foreign attempts to 
dominate the Muslim world. Their ultimate goals were to recruit and train activists, 
overthrow the corrupt Iraqi regime, establish a just Islamic state, and then export their 
success throughout the umma.182 In practice however, this ambitious agenda was only 
modestly implemented. The focus during the 1960s was primarily on education and 
recruitment.  
Periodicals were the primary means of disseminating the party’s views to the 
public during this era. Sadr wrote editorials in the al-Adwa journal, a mouthpiece for the 
leadership of the Shiite hierarchy. More radical was the Da’wah’s official, but illegal, 
journal Sawt al-Da’wah. During the Arif regime (1964-68) the Shiites were generally 
free from state persecution and Da’wah membership dramatically increased. These 
recruits were mostly drawn from university students and intelligentsia. This group 
remained the core constituency of the Da’wah until the Iranian revolution. The party 
never really was able to achieve populist support in the form of widespread activism.  
Much of Sadr’s rhetoric and labor was focused on the reform of the Marja’iya, 
the Shiite religious hierarchy. Though possessing a loose structure, the system was based 
upon personal loyalties and the charismatic leadership of the most senior scholars. There 
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was no way outside of personal persuasion for senor leadership to disseminate and more 
importantly enforce edicts upon junior clerics. As a result, the ulama tended to struggle as 
much internally for prestige and influence as they did externally against the state. As a 
whole, the ulama had difficulty publicizing their agenda to the public because there was 
no coherent policy since every influential ‘alim promoted his own agenda. Sadr sought to 
institutionalize the system, creating a series of qualifications, required curricula, and 
merit-based promotions to advance within the hierarchy in lieu of the ad hoc and uneven 
system that was in place.183 Sadr’s establishment of the Usul al-Din College in Baghdad, 
though short- lived, was an attempt to inculcate these values in seminary students.  
 The Shiite movement began to gain momentum in the mid 1970s. State 
repression of religious observances, such as the 1977 crackdown on a procession of 
pilgrims traveling between Najaf and Karbala, outraged many Shiites and prompted mass 
protests.184 The Iranian revolution in 1978-79 fanned the flames of protest, further 
radicalizing the movement. Sadr’s reputation and popularity grew significantly in light of 
the Iranian revolution. He was known for his scholarship and support of the wilayet e-
faqih, though the nuances of his theological disagreements with Khomeini were not 
widely publicized. Furthermore, Sadr’s popular appeal was enhanced by Iran’s Arab 
language radio station endorsing his rule, calling him the “Khomeini of Iraq.”185 This 
widespread popularity compounded with his support from Iran’s revolutionary 
government made Sadr the Iraqi regime’s most dangerous adversary and eventually led to 
his execution.  
As the Iranian revolution took hold, tension grew between the Ba’ath regime and 
the Shiite community, culminating in a winner-take-all struggle for state control. The 
state used several tactics to critically weaken the Shiite movement. Saddam Hussein 
attempted to derail the ulama’s claims of Ba’athist atheism with several statements 
regarding religion. Hussein’s argument was that though the Ba’ath party was secular, its 
members were certainly believers; this was essentially an argument for separation of 
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religion and government.186 Further, he argued that the forces attempting to destabilize 
his government were merely using religion as cover for their political agenda. In this way 
the movement was not religiously motivated, rather the trappings of religion had been 
hijacked in what amounted to a power grab.187 One of the most significant aspects of 
Ba’ath counter- framing was the shift to calling Iraqi Shiites Persians.188 The Iraqi regime 
considered Shiite sympathy for the Iranian Revolution an internal threat. In light of the 
increasing tension and eventual hostilities with revolutionary Iran, describing their 
adversaries as Persian, despite the fact that many had lived in Iraq for generations, helped 
foster public support for repression. Many so-called “non-Arabs” were expelled from the 
hawza at government insistence, and through the Iran-Iraq War many were deported.  
The leadership of the Da’wah became invigorated by the success of the Iranian 
revolution and came to believe that a similar event could be carried out in Iraq.189 In the 
event, swift and brutal state repression decisively destroyed popular Shiite activism in 
Iraq. Activists who were not killed fled in mass, mostly to Iran. Political opportunity 
certainly existed in the wake of the Iranian revolution that could have been successfully 
exploited. Strong external support from Iran and the internal Ba’ath power struggle set in 
place favorable conditions. In the battle to mobilize resources, however, the Shiite 
movement failed. By not framing their argument effectively, the broad support for their 
movement was lacking until the last moment. What resulted were basically semi-
organized mobs, incapable of standing up to the relatively disciplined regime forces.  
Additionally, little effort was made to garner international support. Following the 
ascent of the Ba’ath and the ensuing confrontation with the hawza, several ulama were 
dispatched to garner foreign support, but most of these delegations were sent to Shiite 
leaders such a Musa al-Sadr in Lebanon. 190 While influential in the global Shiite 
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community, these leaders were incapable of bringing significant pressure against the Iraqi 
regime.  
During the 1980s and 1990s the Shiite opposition movement operated in exile.191 
The Da’wah resided in Iran for most of the Iran-Iraq War, though they increasingly 
moved to Western countries following the Gulf War of 1990-91. By associating closely 
with Iran the Shiite movement made further framing missteps. Although the Shiites still 
living in Iraq generally opposed the Ba’ath regime, they also opposed Iranian domination 
and influence, thereby delegitimizing the exiles in many eyes.192 The strong emotions 
resulting from the seizure and hostage situation of the United States embassy during the 
Iranian revolution caused knee jerk opposition in the West to anything associated with 
Iran. By their close association with Iran the exiles colored their perception in the West 
and the rest of the international community.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between political opportunity, mobilization structures, and 
framing is interactive and interdependent, with changes in one area affecting the others. 
Indeed, the lines between the factors themselves are often blurred, making it difficult at 
times to definitively ascertain whether an event is one or the other. In many cases both 
are true. Without a sufficient degree of success in each area, however, a movement is 
doomed to failure.  
The three case studies that have been discussed realized varied levels of success 
in their framing. Hezbollah was arguably the most successful; the Party of God 
implemented a self-conscious framing strategy that portrayed the movement as one of 
Lebanese patriotism and resistance to invasion motivated by religion. Furthermore, the 
movement seems to have survived its greatest challenge, military success, by redefining 
itself as a political participant rather than an outside challenger. The Bahraini movement 
was also quite successful; the movement remained true to its initial objective of regaining 
political influence. Though led by ulama and often framed in Shiite symbology, the 
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movement retained cross-sectarian support by clinging firmly to its secular political 
objectives. The Da’wah failed in Iraq largely due to its inability to provide the public 
with a convincing platform until it was too late to mobilize sufficient resources to 
challenge the state. In effect, the Iranian revolution provided both an example and an 
effective framing scheme, but the disorganized Iraqi ulama was unable to capitalize on 
these. The Iraqis did not sufficiently overcome Tarrow’s framing dilemma.  
Wiktorowicz asserts that successful framing, “…must articulate and disseminate 
frameworks of understanding that resonate with potential participants and broader publics 
to elicit collective action.”193 Shiite Islam has a rich tradition associated with oppression, 
social justice, and legitimacy of government. This robust corpus of symbology provided 
an excellent way to frame opposition movements primarily composed of Shiites. The key 
obstacle to overcome with this approach was the tradition of political quietism on the part 
of the ulama. Khomeini’s doctrine of the wilayet e-faqih provided an answer to Tarrow’s 
dilemma that provided symbols traditional enough to resonate, but radical enough to 
provoke action. Traditional arguments resonated, but without the change in intellectual 
direction affected by the Khomeini, and to a lesser extent Shari’ati, Shiite symbols would 
have only reinforced the status quo.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The rise of political Islam has been as influential in the Shiite world as in the 
Sunni. In contrast to those, the Shiite movements are led by the religious hierarchy rather 
then by the anti-establishment lay activists so dominant in Sunni movements. The Shiite 
ulama have become much more involved in the political realm, beginning in the 1960s-
70s with the articulation of the new ideology that empowered the Iranian Revolution. 
Though a significant portion of the ulama retained their quietist tradition, enough felt 
motivated by the renunciation of entezar and the value of the wilayet e-faqih to become a 
major force in the political landscape.  
Several factors encouraged the ulama to become the core leadership of the 
movements examined in this study: the ulama’s traditional role of protector; their mastery 
of Shiite history and law; their in situ organization and hierarchy; and the example of 
Iran.194 The ulama were the legitimate voice of dissent against regimes that deviated 
from the course proscribed by their faith. The ulama were historically a buffer between 
ruler and subject, ensuring that their flock was adequately protected from elite excesses. 
The clerics fell into, and were accepted in, this role. Shiites assert that the only legitimate 
sovereign is God. The Imams, as God’s infallible representatives on Earth, exercised 
religious and temporal authority in His name. Following the occultation of the Twelfth 
Imam, the Shiite community was left without a clear leader. The ulama have asserted that 
by virtue of their religious study, they are the best, if fallible, guides to lead the 
community in accordance with the dictates of God.195  
For most of history, however, the ulama’s assertion of this power was restricted to 
a few specific areas such as guardianship for orphans, the handicapped, and widows. 
Temporal authority of non-clerics was tacitly accepted, as long as the ruler restricted his 
actions within the bounds of Islamic law. Only in rare instances, such as Iran’s Tobacco 
Revolt (1891-92) or resistance to the British invasion of Iraq during the First World War, 
have the ulama directly involved themselves in politics. In these and similar cases the 
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perception was that the ulama was acting to counter the regime’s exploitation of their 
followers. Khomeini’s doctrine of the wilayet e-faqih threw off this self- imposed 
limitation and asserted that despite their fallibility, the ulama were the most legitimate 
leaders available. While many prominent ulama did not completely subscribe to 
Khomeini’s doctrine, it did play a significant role in opening the door for clerical 
involvement in political activism.  
The ulama’s mastery of Shiite law, history, and tradition provided significant 
potential for their emergence as a powerful political group. Since every Shiite is required 
to choose and follow a specific marja’s rulings, the ulama’s authority to declare actions 
obligatory can have a forceful effect.196 Reaction to a marja’s fatwas can certainly vary; 
depending on a follower’s degree of devotion or other pragmatic factors, he may or may 
not actively obey the ruling. Nevertheless, the issuance of fatwas tends to place the 
religious leadership on the moral high ground and makes it difficult for lay opponents to 
justify their opposition. The contribution of the ulama to the framing of a movement was 
considerable. Not only were they knowledgeable about the history and symbology to 
draw from, through their sermons and writings they were practiced in choosing issues 
that resonated with their target audience. Additionally, the Shiite ulama had maintained 
its credibility with the public. Unlike the Sunni ulama, the Shiite jurists were independent 
from the state, and were therefore not compromised by close association with repressive 
regimes. The hierarchy enjoyed varying degrees of fiscal autonomy that enabled them to 
fund activism without the regime’s knowledge or support.   
The Shiite hierarchy’s in situ organization gave the ulama a significant advantage 
over possible rivals for the leadership of their movements. A significant precursor for a 
successful social movement is the ability to mobilize resources faster than one’s 
opponent.197 The robust infrastructure of mosques, mourning houses (matams or 
Husayniyyas), and charity organizations provided the ulama relatively safe meeting 
places and the ability to tangibly help needy constituents. The Friday sermon often 
became a forum for mobilization, giving the ulama access to a large number of 
sympathetic people that could be influenced by their views.  
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The most effective motivator for new recruits to join opposition movements in an 
authoritarian context is friendship with a current member.198 Prayer and study groups 
were excellent conduits for the creation of these informal networks of recruitment. Such 
meetings enjoyed the advantage of being an acceptable form of association even when 
most other venues for public gathering were banned or strictly regulated. Additionally, 
since these groups were generally small and composed of members who knew each other, 
infiltration by government agents was difficult.  
The example of Iran had a fundamental impact on all three movements. Its major 
contribution was as a demonstration effect . The Islamic Revolution demonstrated that a 
social movement could overcome a powerful and authoritarian ruler, even one with 
superpower support. The Iranian ideology encouraged the pious to renounce quietism and 
take active steps to achieve a just society. In this context the ulama were the obvious 
choice to lead the effort.  After all, the successful Iranian experiment was led by the 
clergy. This view is, of course, oversimplified and flawed. The abortive Iraqi and early-
Bahraini (during the 1980s) attempts to incite ulama led resurrection failed to take into 
account the complex web of facilitators present in the Iranian revolution, but absent in the 
Bahraini and Iraqi socio-political contexts. The Bahraini movement in particular was too 
closely associated with Iranian motives to attract local interest.199 In neither case was the 
public willing to accept Iranian domination, even if doing so perpetuated their grievances. 
Simply, the ulama had to capitalize on existing societal grievances and mobilize a wide 
variety of public support focused into productive action by an effective organization. The 
two examples of failure were little more than ulama led riots, incapable of sustaining 
themselves.  
Given this discussion so far, it seems that the ulama are the indispensable leaders 
of Shiite social movements. As well respected members of their community, who 
traditionally have a legal and leadership role, and who usually have significant resources 
at their disposal, the ulama’s emergence as opposition leaders is not surprising. Several 
factors, however, counter the aforementioned positives and mitigate the ability of the 
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ulama to exercise decisive control of their communities: their loose hierarchy, 
vulnerability to state repression, and their traditional role in the eyes of the people.  
While the religious hierarchy is an advantage for the ulama with respect to 
possible competitors, its loose nature makes it a liability as well. The competition 
between leading mujtahids to attract followers and enforce their claim to be the supreme 
jurist, the Marja’ taqlid, is the centerpiece of this struggle. Personal charisma plays an 
important role in this dynamic; the process of marja’ selection is fluid and resists 
institutionalization. 200 On the surface the process is simple. A mujtahid who desires to 
become recognized as a marja’ publishes his risala, a commentary that delineates his 
legal opinion on a variety of issues. All that remains is attracting followers, who express 
their commitment by offering alms, and the general acceptance of his peers. Though 
religious scholarship matters for a marja’s reputation, his relative position is often 
estimated by the number of his followers.201 Attaining consensus regarding one’s 
preeminence is difficult. Walbridge notes that even during the zenith of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s popularity, most Shiites followed Ayatollah Kho’i of Najaf. This fierce 
competition among marjas can also be seen in the disagreement between Ayatollahs 
Fadlallah and Khamenei for the leadership of Lebanon’s Shiites.202 Hezbollah aligned 
with Khamenei out of concern for the continuance of Iranian financial support, while 
most other Shiites, and unofficially many of Hezbollah’s members, followed Fadlallah. 
The charisma-based system of consensus makes enforcing policy on subordinates 
difficult. In this way the marja’, while certainly a figure of power, is limited to actions he 
can convince others to follow. This makes swift action difficult since consensus by its 
nature takes time. This factor is a significant limitation on the movement’s ability to 
counter external threats.  
The religious hierarchy and infrastructure can be vulnerable to state repression. 
As discussed above, the marja’ is a public figure who must attract supporters. Even when 
the marja’ himself is isolated, followers acting on his behalf must fulfill his duties to 
provide guidance to the public. The public nature of the position exposes the clerics to the 
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state’s repressive apparatus. The physical infrastructure, mosques and the like, are 
vulnerable to the state as well. The Ba’ath regime in Iraq for instance, seized property 
belonging to the religious hierarchy and interjected itself into the operation of the hawza 
to combat the growing influence of the Shiite ulama.203 In Lebanon, the IDF targeted 
leading clerics for execution in an attempt to decapitate Hezbollah’s resistance 
movement.204 A similar campaign of clerical persecution and arrests occurred in 
Bahrain.205 While ulama are fairly easy targets for repression, the regime’s efforts are 
usually ineffective. The decentralized nature of the Shiite hierarchy, though a hindrance 
to efficient command and control, also safeguards against decapitation.  
Compounding the difficulty of ulama-led social movements is that the wilayet e-
faqih was never broadly accepted. Traditionalists like Ayatollahs Kho’i and Sistani never 
considered the doctrine to be legitimate and held to their belief of clerical aloofness from 
politics.206 Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr agreed with Khomeini’s doctrine in principle, but 
sought to institutionalize the office in line with modern bureaucratic organization. 207 In 
this way the marja’iya would be able to overcome many of the organizational problems 
discussed above that impair their ability to gain consensus and act decisively.  
Fadlallah also agreed with the wilayet e-faqih in theory, but had reservations. 
First, he was concerned that the reliance on charismatic leadership placed the focus on 
the leader himself rather than his message.208 Sadr’s organizational reforms could be seen 
as a way to mitigate this weakness. More importantly, Fadlallah pragmatically accepted 
that an Islamic state according to the Iranian model was impractical and unrealistic with 
Lebanon’s heterogeneous populous.209 Fadlallah’s major contribution is his view that the 
marja’iya and the wilayet e-faqih should be separate.210 He argues that multiple wilaya 
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are permissible, with each jurist holding political authority in separate states. The 
marja’iya, however, would be the religious and symbolic leader of the entire umma. 
Over time the Iranian Revolution and the wilayet e-faqih have lost their appeal. 
The Shiite ulama assert their authority through their mastery of the massive corpus of 
religious law and tradition. Their legitimacy is claimed and, “…believed in on the basis 
of the sanctity of the order and the attendant powers of control as they have been handed 
down from the past…”211 While there is some flexibility inherent in the ulama’s ability 
to exercise ijtihad, or interpretation of the religious law, a mujtahid that exceeds 
traditional constraints effectively undermines his own legitimacy and that of the religious 
institution. Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of the wilayet e-faqih is a classic example of 
overstepping the bonds of tradition. However, Khomeini was able to exert effective 
charismatic authority, thereby overcoming the delegitimizing effect of radical divergence 
from tradition. This charismatic authority manifested as the complete personal devotion 
imparted to Khomeini by those who recognized his divine mission. 212 The important 
factor is that loyalty was to the person Ruhollah Khomeini and not his position as a 
mujtahid. By using charismatic authority to achieve non-traditional objectives, as was the 
case of an ulama-run theocracy, Khomeini undermined the legitimacy of the religious 
hierarchy.  
The arbitrary promotion of lesser ulama to high office, along with a 
commensurate increase in religious rank, is an extraordinary example of this 
phenomenon. Following Khomeini’s death, there existed no marja’ capable of asserting 
similar charismatic authority. Ali Khamenei eventually succeeded Khomeini as the 
Supreme Leader, despite having been elevated from the office of hojat al-islam to 
Ayatollah just prior to his ascension. 213 Khamenei had not published any of the scholarly 
works normally required to become an Ayatollah; his religious credentials were lacking.  
Had Khamenei exhibited the charisma of his predecessor, bypassing the traditional 
qualification process would have been a minor impediment. However, without the appeal 
of charismatic authority, Khamenei was forced to fall back on the prestige of his position 
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as an Ayatollah, a resort to traditional authority, the very force that his promotion 
undermined.  
Given the natural leadership potential of the ulama and the chronic underlying 
grievances present in each case study, the question remains, Why now? Why did these 
social movements erupt at that specific point of time? A definitive inquiry of that 
question is beyond the scope of this study, I will however, briefly speculate. Several 
economic policies on the part of the Khalifah regime exacerbated Bahrain’s chronic 
grievances into acute protest.214 During the early-1990s the government rewarded elite 
business owners by subsidizing the construction of large, Western-style shopping centers. 
This had the effect of hurting small business owners and hindering privately-funded 
construction projects that could not compete against state subsidization. Additionally, 
state aid packages intended to help the development of domestic industry went to 
companies that outsourced jobs to immigrant workers instead of the local working class. 
Similarly, the government aided the wrong sector for development, focusing on light 
industry rather than heavy industry; a decision that cost many working class Shiites their 
employment. Finally, Bahraini women had entered the workforce during the 1980s and 
received significant education and training. During the early 1990s, the regime, worried 
about Islamist inroads into the female population, reduced support for these programs. As 
a result of these economic policies, the unemployment rate among the lower classes, 
particularly among Shiites, grew significantly. The arrest of prominent Shiite ulama in 
1994 triggered the frustration on the part of the lower classes and resulted in mass protest. 
The mobilization of Lebanon’s Shiites is straight forward. The increasingly 
disproportionate Shiite representation in the Lebanese government came to the fore by 
the early-1970s as a source of significant grievance.215 When the increasingly fragile 
National Pact became subject to the pressure of the PLO’s arrival en masse following 
“Black September” 1970, the system eventually failed, leading to collapse and civil war, 
beginning in 1975. Like other confessional groups, the Shiites armed themselves for self-
defense and to guard their interests. The 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions provided a 
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catalyst for the creation of Hezbollah and its emergence as a power center.216 The invasion 
of their land, by an enemy who had already conquered and displaced the Palestinians, 
prompted armed resistance.  
In Iraq, the ulama initially mobilized, through the founding of the Da’wah party, 
in order to combat the increasing secularization of the Shiite laity. Through the 1960s 
until the mid-1970s, the perpetuation of a Shiite revival and attempts to protect the rights 
of religious observance dominated Da’wah activities. The uprising led by Muhammad 
Baqir al-Sadr with the intent of overthrowing the Ba’ath regime by following the Iranian 
model, was a perfect example of Kurzman’s mismatch between structural and perceived 
political opportunity. Failing to recognize Iran’s sui generis experience as such, Sadr 
perceived greater political opportunity than existed, with disastrous results.  
The Shiite ulama will not attempt to install Iranian-style Islamic regimes in 
countries they dominate. Iran’s example was a key factor in Shiite social mobilization 
throughout the Middle East following the revolution. Today, Iran’s example as a twenty-
five year long experiment in Islamic government is just as powerful and generally viewed 
as a failure. The leading Shiite jurists seem to have realized that they can wield much 
more influence by staying out of politics directly, instead acting as a powerful interest 
group more or less behind the scenes. As the Iranian case demonstrates, directly 
assuming political office opens one to the inevitable criticism and association with failed 
or unpopular policies. A better path would be to assume the traditional role of the ulama: 
scholars that provide advice to lay officials who govern in accordance with the 
requirements of religious law.  
The developments in post-Ba’ath Iraq provide an excellent example of this 
dynamic. Few would argue that Ayatollah Sistani has been apolitical since the fall of 
Saddam Hussein. He was the driving force behind holding general elections before the 
constitution was written. 217 His opposition to this forced the Coalition Provisional 
Authority to change its stated plans and hold elections for the National Assembly that 
will be responsible for writing the constitution. The Ayatollah also issued a statement 
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asserting that it was every Iraqi’s obligation to legally register and vote in the election. 218 
Sistani is also credited with convincing Shiites to show restraint by not retaliating against 
Sunnis for terrorist attacks against their communities.219 This restraint diffuses the 
attempts of insurgents to incite a sectarian-based civil war in Iraq. Despite what can only 
be considered significant influence, Ayatollah Sistani does not seek political office for 
himself or the religious hierarchy generally. He states that,  
The Supreme Marja’iya is by no means whatsoever looking to establish 
itself as a political authority in Iraq...The Supreme Marja’iya always 
transcends political parties and groups. It safeguards the interests of 
religion and guides those who distance themselves from the Marja’iya to 
the right path. 220 
This statement succinctly argues the position of the traditional ulama, that their role is to 
protect the interests of religion and advise those who govern.  
The lesson for U.S. policy is that Iranian-style governments are not an imminent 
threat anywhere in the Shiite world. The ulama have generally learned from the negative 
example of Iran and realized that they are able to exercise power much more effectively 
as a separate and highly respected institution rather than hold office directly. The ulama 
are an extremely influential center of power in the Shiite community, wielding vast moral 
authority, the ability to mobilize significant resources, and mastery of symbols and 
framing that resonate with their constituency. Despite this considerable influence, the 
ulama is also severely constrained. Drawing their authority from a rich and complex 
tradition, they are unable to deviate radically from that tradition’s doctrine without 
undermining the ir legitimacy. In hindsight it is possible to consider the wilayet e-faqih an 
example of the ulama overstepping tradition to their detriment. Though arguably 
justifiable within the bounds of Shiite theology, in practice it diverged too far from the 
expectations of the Shiite community. In response, recent events demonstrate a return to 
the ulama’s customary and accepted role.   
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